



JANAAGRAHA CENTRE FOR CITIZENSHIP & DEMOCRACY

Voter List Management

Survey on the
Quality of Voter Lists in Delhi

Summary of Research Findings

July 2015



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Introduction

Jana Group was Co-Founded by Ramesh Ramanathan and Swati Ramanathan. It comprises four institutions, all of which are urban-focussed



Janalakshmi, an urban micro finance company serving 2.5 million households across India



Janaadhar, an urban affordable housing company



Jana Urban Space Foundation, a non-profit focussed on spatial planning and design, both policy and practice




Janaagraha, a non-profit having the objective of transforming quality of life in India's cities and towns

About Janaagraha

Janaagraha was founded in December 2001 as a platform for citizen participation in cities. Today, it works with citizens on catalysing active citizenship in neighbourhoods and with governments to institute reforms to city-systems, generally referred to as urban governance.

With an objective of improving quality of life in India's urban centres, Janaagraha believes in addressing the root-cause of existing issues instead of the symptoms through its city-systems framework. This framework consist of four inter-related dimensions critical to the running of world-class cities.


CITY SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK




Janaagraha's work on Voter List Management

'Empowered and Legitimate Political Representation' is one of the four components of Janaagraha's city-systems framework. We believe quality of voter lists can potentially influence quality of political leadership in cities. The Voter List Management process in cities however has been a much ignored electoral reform agenda. Voter lists form the basis of democracy by codifying a citizen's right to exercise franchise. But errors in these lists, omissions that lead to disenfranchisement and potential deletions which expose the electoral process to phantom voting, are a reality. This applies particularly to urban areas which witness large scale migrations, from villages to cities, between cities and even within cities. For quality political representation and leadership, the voter list should be free of errors. Poor quality voter lists impact electoral participation and outcomes, and thereby the quality of political leadership.

JCCD has been working on the issue of urban voter lists since 2005, highlights of which include the Jaago Re! campaign, India's largest voter registration drive in cities and a 3-year Memorandum of Understanding with the Election Commission of India for a pilot project on voter list management in Shanthinagar Assembly Constituency in Bangalore. The groundwork in Shanthinagar resulted in the Proper Urban Electoral (PURE) List manual, a new and improved process for voter list management in cities.



Through research studies such as this, we aim to develop a body of irrefutable data and information that can catalyse reforms to voter list management in cities. We believe that such studies, based on both primary surveys and desktop research, are critical to electoral reforms in the country.



Executive Summary

1. Executive Summary

The Quality of Lists Study (QoL), a part of the efforts by Janaagraha to improve the accuracy of voter lists in India's urban centres, was conducted in Delhi just before the 2015 assembly elections. This study aimed to serve as a body of objective information that throws light on the issues inherent in Delhi's voter lists*.

It was designed to effectively capture deletions, i.e. people who exist on a voter list but shouldn't be, as well as omissions i.e. people who should be on the voter list but are not. Using a two pronged approach, the study used a Voter List-Centric methodology (to capture deletions) and a Citizen-Centric methodology (for omissions) and went to over 6,000 citizens spread across Delhi in a manner that ensured robust representation.

Key findings from the study are as follows:

There is sufficient evidence to indicate that a large part of Delhi's voter lists are unclean and are not up to date.

- **The list-centric research**, which was based on a sample of citizens who existed on Delhi's lists, found that 41% of these entries included one of a range of errors. Eleven percent of all addresses on the list could not be located on ground despite a desk-based address quality research stage indicating that all but two of these addresses were 'findable'. It was also found that 21% of sampled citizens who were on the list had shifted to another location. A further 7% of citizens had errors in their details mentioned on the list.
- **The citizen-centric research**, which checked random citizens of Delhi against the voter list, found that 49% were omitted from their polling part voter lists. Twenty eight percent were registered elsewhere in Delhi and 8% claimed to have applied from their current address but were not on the list. Twelve percent had either not/never applied to register on their polling part (PP) list or could not recall if they ever had.

Data from the two surveys indicates that potential deletions and omissions in Delhi's electoral rolls are of a large magnitude. A more nuanced picture emerges when reading the two research phases together.

A large part of required deletions in Delhi may be 'off-set' by omissions due to intra-city migration i.e. a large number of citizens who are not on their polling part lists are registered elsewhere within the city.

- It appears that most citizens who should be 'deleted' from the voter list (23% were not found at the address mentioned against them on the voter list), are actually residing somewhere else within Delhi (in another Polling Part or in another Assembly Constituency). This conclusion is made in relation to the fact that 28% of omitted citizens from the voter list are registered elsewhere in the city.
- Given this, the electoral impact and impact on voter turnout therefore (in the state of Delhi) of having such number of deletions may not be as grave as the magnitude suggests.
- Most of these errors, of deletion and omission, appear as singularities spread across the city and not in bunches, making it difficult for them to be exploited or taken advantage of. Although this still means that the lists are unclean, the potential impact with respect to electoral outcomes, voting malpractices such as phantom/bogus voting etc., in Delhi, require further investigation.

Seven percent of Delhi's citizens reported having errors with their details as mentioned on the voter lists but only two sampled citizens reported facing any issues while casting their vote.

- Errors with citizens' details on the voter list, mostly minor mistakes in addresses, do not appear to prevent a citizen's vote in almost all cases. These errors were also found to be spread more or less evenly across gender, housing type and religion (31-35 year olds had a higher probability of having such errors; at 21%, 1.4 times their representation in the sample).

* the term 'Voter Lists' and 'Electoral Lists/Electoral Rolls/Voter Rolls' have been used interchangeably in this document and mean the same.

Twelve percent of Delhi's 18+ citizenry claimed to have never tried to register or could not recall registering from their current address (perhaps pointing to apathy).


- The 12% of citizens who claimed to have never tried to register or could not recall if they ever had, included 7% who had never applied from their current address and 5% who could not recall if they had. Citizens who had not registered cited a lack of knowledge on where and how to register as reasons for not doing so. As well as these, other strong reasons included a perception of the process being too tedious and a belief that they did not possess the right paperwork to register. The youngest age group (18-25 forming a huge 47%), lower SECs (C, D and E at a combined 67%) and Muslims (at 17%, 1.3 times their proportion in the total sample) were more likely to have never registered from their current address.

Overall, there seems to be little doubt that Delhi's electoral rolls are unclear. With large amounts of deletions and additions required to the list, there is a sharp need for improved voter list management processes. This is required regardless of the fact that a large part of the errors in Delhi are due to citizens moving from one address to the other, within the city. Due to the latter however, the effects of these errors on electoral outcomes and voter-turn-out, therefore, may not be as grave as the figures suggest (i.e. 23% 'Deletions' and 49% 'Total Omissions' w.r.t. polling parts). Since a large number of deletions appear to be off-set by omissions, it is entirely possible that citizens registered elsewhere in the city, as long as they are aware and willing, do actually exercise their right to vote on Election Day by going to the polling booths they are registered at.

Deletions and omissions which may relate more directly to electoral outcomes and voter turn-out are those from the categories of 'address not founds' (up to 11% of all on Delhi's lists) and 'repeats/dead/disenfranchised' citizens (1% of all citizens on Delhi's lists). Similarly, the omissions would comprise citizens who claim to have registered to be on their PP lists but are not on it (8% of Delhi's 18+ population). This means that for any advocacy efforts, a key focus should be on removing those names classified as 'repeats/dead/disenfranchised' and possibly a significant chunk of those classified under 'address not found', though the latter remains an uncertain category. Similarly, in omissions, focus needs to be on making sure that all citizens who have applied to register, are actually added on to the lists. That said, the overall need for better maintenance of the list to ensure citizens are registered in the correct PPs, with the correct information, remains.

Since most of the list errors appear to be spread evenly across the city, it makes little case for them to be exploited for undue gains. From anecdotal evidence, malpractices such as phantom voting/bogus voting or booth capturing etc. tend to take place only in certain areas pointing to a geographic concentration of errors that lend themselves to exploitation; this is something that the Delhi study did not find evidence on, probably partly due to the random sampling approach taken. Whatever may be the reason behind the errors on the list and their consequences, data gathered from this study suggests that those less privileged are usually worse off when it comes to electoral rolls. Deletions and omissions appear to be higher for lower SECs (Socio-Economic Classification type), lower castes and in some cases, Muslims; and among these, the younger and more mobile age groups. Not only this, but this demographic of citizens are also more likely to not have tried to apply from their current addresses because of a lack of awareness and knowledge, clubbed with a perception of the entire process being too tedious and difficult.

While this research has been largely successful in bringing out an objective picture of the state of Delhi's electoral rolls, it also leaves several questions that require further thought and investigation. For example, a large proportion of Delhi's residents appear to have been living in the city for five years or more which may explain why a lot of the errors on the voter list may be intra-city migrations. Other cities with different migration patterns, or a more detailed look at recent migrant communities in Delhi, may throw up different list quality issues. Other cities' lists may also vary in the quality of the address details they hold leading to other concerns of list content. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to explore different research methodologies to try to better understand issues such as bogus voting/phantom voting or other such malpractices as well as identifying specific issues with the registration process.



Key Figures From Both Surveys

2. Key Figures From Both Surveys

Tables 1 and 2 provide the overall picture of errors that plague voter lists in Delhi. These results, when read together, provide directions into both broad errors i.e. of deletion, from the list-centric phase and of omission, from the citizen-centric phase.

In particular, a key finding from the list-centric survey was that 21% citizens were found to have shifted. At the same time, 28% of citizens in the citizen-centric survey who were omitted from the list indicated they were registered elsewhere in Delhi (either in a different PP in the same AC or in another AC)- see the arrow relating the figures between the two tables. Given both phases of work were undertaken in the same ACs and PPs and both are representative of the Delhi population, it is possible to read the data together and suggest that most of the citizens who were found to be shifted are still likely to be within the city of Delhi.

Table 1: Results from the List-centric Survey – all major error types (n=3017)

	Numbers	%
Total Citizens Sampled (including 10% buffer)	3246	-
Refusals to participate /Door Locked	229	-
Total Effective Sample (n)	3017	100.0%
Address Not Found (ANF)	331	11.0%
Out of these - Findable	329	10.9%
Out of these - Non-Findable	2	<1%
Total Deletions	683	22.6%
Shifted	644	21.3%
Repeats/Duplicated	8	0.3%
Dead	30	1.0%
Disenfranchised	1	<1%
Errors With Registration Details	221	7.3%
No Errors	1782	59.1%

Table 2: Results from the Citizen-centric Survey – all major error types (n=3256)

	n	% of total sample	% of total omissions
Total Sample Achieved	3256	-	
Total Omissions	1595	49.0%	-
Citizens Registered Elsewhere In Delhi	904	27.8%	56.7%
In other polling parts	838	25.7%	52.5%
In other assembly constituencies	66	2.0%	4.1%
Citizens Registered Outside Delhi	36	1.1%	2.3%
Citizens who have applied from current address	275	8.4%	17.2%
Others (never applied/applied from somewhere else)	223	6.8%	14.0%
Don't Know/Can't Say	157	4.8%	9.8%
NOT OMITTED	1661	51.0%	-


In light of this, arguably, the deletions and omissions which are not migrations within the city may be seen differentially to those which are. In Delhi, out of the total errors found, it appears that these deletions are those from the categories of 'address not founds' (up to 11% of all on Delhi's lists, see Table 1) and 'repeats/dead/disenfranchised' citizens (1.4% of all citizens on Delhi's lists, see Table 1). Similarly, the omissions would comprise of citizens who claim to have registered to be on their PP lists but are not on it (8% of Delhi's 18+ population, see Table 2).

Aside from this, data from both surveys appears to show that the younger age group, especially 26-35, the poorer and marginalized sections of society (lower SECs¹ and those residing in lower housing types²) are worse off with respect to errors on the list. Broadly speaking, errors tend to be found more likely for citizens who are relatively less well off, are young and mobile and belong to Hindu lower castes; and in some error types, more likely for citizens reporting Islam as their religion.

¹SECs C, D and E.

²'Lower Middle Class Housing' or 'One room home/Designated Slum' or 'Self-Built Informal Slum Housing'.





Introduction To The Design And Methodology

3. Introduction To The Design And Methodology

3.1 Design

In broad terms, the on-going research into the quality of urban voter lists has been aiming to measure two types of errors on the voter list:

- **Errors of deletion:** names which are on the list but should not be.
- **Errors of inclusion:** names which should be included on the list but are not there.

Due to the nature of the errors, typically two different methodologies have been used to capture the extent of these across urban populations. In basic terms these are:

- **Voter-list-centric surveys:** which are used to **measure errors of deletion**: The sampling basis for this survey type is a citizen name and associated details on the actual voter list. Essentially in this method, the citizen is pre-selected from the voter-list and surveyors try to locate this citizen. In general terms, either a person is found at their address or not. The latter being an error of deletion.
- **Citizen-centric surveys:** which are used to **measure errors of inclusion**. The sampling basis for this survey type is a household and a random adult over 18 within this household. Essentially in this method a citizen is located by household selection and consequently checked against the voter list. In general terms, a citizen is either on the list or not. The latter being an error of inclusion.

In reality there are some subtle complexities and grey areas in not only the methodologies but also the categorisations of these errors which are fully outlined in the larger report.

3.2 Methodology

The methodology consisted of a voter-list and a citizen-centric phase and both were split into two parts:

- **Voter-list phase**
 - o Part 1: Desk review of 'findability' of voter-list addresses of sampled citizens
 - o Part 2: Field survey of the same sampled citizens as part 1
- **Citizen-centric phase**
 - o Part 1: Field survey of households in the same PPs and ACs as sampled for voter-list phase
 - o Part 2: Desk review to verify registration of citizens in other ACs and PPs as well as checking for non-registration following attempts to register using the latest voter rolls.

3.3 Sampling

The Urban Local Body (ULB) population in Delhi is 11.03 million. The 2011 census of India indicates that in Delhi, 67%³ of the population is aged 18 or above. Equating this proportion to the ULB population of Delhi leaves the target population at 7.37 million citizens of voting age. To ensure sample representation with a 95% confidence level and a confidence interval of +/- 1.8% at the city level, an achieved sample size of 2963* citizens was required for each survey. Citizens were over-sampled to account for 10% proportion of 'door closed' and 'non-participation' eventualities. This meant a total of 3293 citizens needed to be sampled for each survey.


The citizens were sampled from Polling Parts (PPs) within Assembly Constituencies (ACs)⁴. Delhi has 70 ACs, of which 41 were classified as 'inner' and 29 were classified as 'periphery' ACs⁵. This classification was determined by taking a 10km radius from the centre of Delhi. Any ACs that fell within this area were classified as 'inner' while any not in that radius were 'periphery' ACs. Any ACs which touched the outer boundary of the ULB were automatically categorized as periphery ACs. To ensure the sample accurately represented both inner and periphery ACs and the geographical spread of ACs, 8 ACs were chosen using semi-purposive stratified random sampling, considering a desired mix of inner and periphery ACs as well as checking for general geographic spread (North, South, East, and West). Within each of the ACs, 34 Polling Parts (PPs) were selected using randomization of the total universe of polling parts per AC and selecting the first 34 randomized parts. Within each PP, 12 citizens were sampled.

* For the purposes of sampling, entire Assembly Constituencies were considered irrespective of the fact that certain areas within these were outside the ULB boundary. The number 2963 is also representative of the entire state of Delhi at the same CL (95%) and CI (+/- 1.8%). This makes the findings generalizable to the entire state of Delhi, something that has been done later in the report.

3. The 2011 census indicates the population of Delhi state to be 16,78,7941. Of this figure, 11,234,061 are 18 or older. This equates to 67% of Delhi state citizens being aged 18 over.

4. October 2014 rolls were used as a sampling base.

5. Classification of Delhi ACs can be found in Appendix 1.



Conceptualizing Errors and The Instrument Flow

4. Conceptualizing errors and the instrument

Each of the phases of the list-centric and citizen-centric work conspired to lead to the conceptualisation of errors within the voter list. The sections below outline the study flow to define and capture these errors.

4.1 List-centric error conceptualization

Figure 1 below shows the key survey flow to define and capture errors with the voter list using the list-centric method. Other questions to capture other details have been outlined but not defined by flow. The full survey can be found in the larger report.

As described earlier, addresses were scored for inclusion of each part of the address to provide an indication of whether the address was substantial enough to be found in the field. Those citizens whose address was deemed not findable were still sought in the field but if the address was not found in the field then it was considered an error with the quality of the address on the voter list. If the address was deemed findable, the entry was either deemed correct (if found on the field) or a deletion (if not found on the field).

4.2 Citizen-centric error conceptualization

Figure 2 below shows the key survey-flow to define and capture errors with the voter list using the citizen-centric method. Other questions to capture other details have been outlined but not defined by flow. The full survey can be found in the larger report.

Figure 1: Survey-flow to define and capture errors with the voter list using the list-centric method




Figure 2: Survey-flow to define and capture errors with the voter list using the citizen-centric method




Table 3 below summarises the error conceptualization in a tabular form. Below this are given the calculations that will form the basis of the error categories.

Table 3: Tabular summary of error conceptualization

LIST - CENTRIC Part 1 - DESK BASED	Part 2 FIELD WORK			VOTER HYGIENE CATEGORY
Address FINDABLE	Address found	Voter found	No error	1. NO ERROR
			Errors	2. POTENTIAL INABILITY TO VOTE
			Repeated	3. DELETION (proportional)
		Voter not found	Door closed/Non-participation	4. REMOVE FROM SAMPLE
			Shifted/dead/Not found/disenfranchised	5. DELETION [MINUS PROPORTION in LINE 3 in CITIZEN-CENTRIC]
	Address not found			6. DELETION
Address NOT FINDABLE	Address found	Voter found	No error	7. NO ERROR
			Errors	8. POTENTIAL INABILITY TO VOTE
			Repeated	9. DELETION (proportional)
		Voter not found	Door closed/Non-participation	10. REMOVE FROM SAMPLE
			Shifted/dead/Not found/disenfranchised	11. DELETION
	Address not found			12. DELETION* CORE LIST QUALITY
CITIZEN-CENTRIC Part 1 - FIELD WORK				
Door available	Registered on the list in the PP - YES	No error		13. NO ERROR
		Errors	ALL errors	14. POTENTIAL INABILITY TO VOTE
			SUB-SET: Wrong address, same PP	15. PROPORTION TO BE REMOVED FROM DELETIONS in LINE 5 in LIST-CENTRIC
		Repeated		16. DELETION (proportional)
	Registered on the list in the PP - NO			17. OMISSION Part 2 – DESK BASED: Cross-check registrations in other PPs & ACs. Cross-check late registrations on latest voter rolls
Door locked			Door closed/Non-participation	18. REMOVE FROM SAMPLE

$$\text{DELETIONS} = \left[\frac{(3^*+5+6+9^*+11+12^{**})}{\text{TOTAL LIST-CENTRIC -10-4}} - \frac{15}{\text{TOTAL CITIZEN-CENTRIC -18}} \right] \%$$

*Potential to cross-check proportions of 3s and 9s with 16s.

**Can include here and/or in DELETION – CORE QUALITY portion

$$\text{DELETION (CORE QUALITY)} = \left[\frac{12}{\text{TOTAL LIST-CENTRIC -10-4}} \right] \%$$

$$\text{OMISSIONS} = \left[\frac{17}{\text{TOTAL CITIZEN-CENTRIC -18}} \right] \%$$

ERRORS WITH REGISTRATION DETAILS =

$$\left[\frac{2 + 8}{\text{TOTAL LIST-CENTRIC -10-4}} \right] \% \quad \text{Can be aligned with} \quad \left[\frac{14}{\text{TOTAL CITIZEN-CENTRIC -18}} \right] \%$$

NO ERROR =

$$\left[\frac{1 + 7}{\text{TOTAL LIST-CENTRIC -10-4}} \right] \% \quad \text{Can be aligned with} \quad \left[\frac{13}{\text{TOTAL CITIZEN-CENTRIC -18}} \right] \%$$



Discussion

5. Discussion

The findings from this project lead to a range of points for discussion and consideration for improving the quality of the voter lists and associated issues, in particular in Delhi.

Overall, there seems to be little doubt that Delhi's electoral rolls are unclean. With large amounts of deletions and additions required to the list, there is a sharp need for improved voter list management processes. This is required regardless of the fact that a large part of the errors in Delhi are due to citizens moving from one address to the other, within the city. The latter however, does mean that the effects of these errors on electoral outcomes and voter turn-out may not be as grave as the magnitude of errors suggest. Since a large number of deletions appear to be off-set by omissions, it is entirely possible that citizens registered elsewhere in the city, as long as they are aware and willing, do actually exercise their right to vote on Election Day by going to the polling booths they are registered at.

Deletions and omissions which may relate more directly to electoral outcomes are those from the categories of 'address not founds' (up to 11% of all on Delhi's lists) and 'repeats/dead/disenfranchised' citizens (1.4% of all citizens on Delhi's lists). Similarly, the omissions would comprise of citizens who claim to have registered to be on their PP lists but are not on it (8% of Delhi's 18+ population). In terms of advocacy, this means a key focus on removing those names classified as 'repeats/dead/disenfranchised' and possibly a significant chunk of those classified under 'address not found', though the latter remains an uncertain category. Similarly, in omissions, focus needs to be on making sure that all citizens who have applied to register, are actually added on to the lists. That said, the overall maintenance of citizens registered in correct PPs with the correct information remains. Furthering the sentiment of requiring better voter list management processes, is the fact that 7% of citizens, though registered in the correct PP, were found to have errors with their details on the list. Though only a small number faced issues voting as a result, the issue of quality list management remains.

In a related point, errors of repetition were not found to be as rife as perhaps suggested given the attention of this issue in the media⁶. This may, in part, be a methodological issue, given that repeats were only searched for within the same PP and done by the citizen surveyed. A lack of rigour may have been there from the citizens' side, with lack of time and interest perhaps forming a part. It may be better to search for duplications in a more automated fashion using appropriate software. This and further methodological reflections can be found in the larger report.

As noted, the 11% of 'addresses not found' remains a grey area of interpretation. Although each address went through a quality check for findability and the vast majority were deemed findable, in actuality there may be a lot of parameters on the ground (not captured by desk research) which may impact the findability of an address. One of these could simply be familiarity with an area. More work could be done to further dissect this category of errors, particularly given that the ECI, as part of its electoral registration process, includes a stage of on-ground verification. If 11% of the sampled addresses were not findable, how are the ECI able to verify these addresses?

Most of the errors with the voter list appear to be spread evenly across the city, leaving little case for them to be exploited for undue gains. From anecdotal evidence, malpractices such as phantom voting/bogus voting or booth capturing etc. tend to take place only in certain areas pointing to a geographic concentration of errors that lend themselves to exploitation. This is something that the Delhi study did not find evidence on, probably partly due to the random sampling approach taken rendering it impossible to see/look for clustered patterns of errors. It is suggested that a different research methodology is used to try to better understand issues such as bogus voting/phantom voting or other such malpractices as well as problems in the registration process, for example a structured review of, and discussion with, Booth Level Officers who are integral to the voter list maintenance process.

⁶ There were several reports, in reputed newspapers and media channels, of the presence of a large number of duplicate entries on the rolls while the study was being conducted. Links to some are as below:

1. The Indian Express - Poll panel finds 90,000 multiple entries in rolls; Source - <http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/poll-panel-finds-90000-multiple-entries-in-rolls/>, last accessed - 16042015

2. DNA India - 89 thousand cases of multiple entries found in Delhi electoral rolls; Source - <http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-89-thousand-cases-of-multiple-entries-found-in-delhi-electoral-rolls-2050013>, last accessed - 16042015

Data from the citizen-centric survey suggests that 12% of the population has either never tried to apply to be on the voter list from their current address or cannot recall if they ever did. This category could arguably form the core of citizens displaying voter apathy. Most of them appear to have been living in their residence for more than two years and yet have not tried or cannot recall having tried to register to be on the voter list at this address. This is more likely to be seen with the less affluent, younger population and also the marginalized. Data shows that this 'apathy' is driven by a lack of awareness on how and where to register and of the documentation required. It also shows that despite a lack of awareness, citizens perceive the process of registration as a very tedious and time consuming one. Therefore, it can be said that efforts to try and get such masses to enrol and exercise their right to vote must start at addressing these problems and such efforts should most definitely reach the marginalized and less affluent sections of society, not to mention the younger population.

While this research has been largely successful in bringing out an objective picture of the state of Delhi's electoral rolls, it also leaves several questions that beg further thought and investigation. For example, a large proportion of Delhi's residents appear to have been living in the city for five years or more which may explain why a lot of the errors on the voter list may be intra-city migrations. Other cities with different migration patterns, or a more detailed look at recent migrant communities in Delhi, may throw up different list quality issues. Other cities' lists may also vary in the quality of the address details they hold leading to other concerns of list content. It is therefore suggested to undertake similar research in other cities, supplemented by other work as outlined, to allow for inter-city comparisons as well as pan-India trends in list quality issues.

Another issue, rather challenge that this study has brought to the fore, is on developing an approach to effectively measure cleanliness of urban rolls. Broadly, there are two basic challenges:

- One being that of **developing the right tool to measure 'quality of voter lists'** and the other of
- **Developing a scalable model, one that is fairly standard but flexible enough to be applied to all urban pockets of the country.**

While the former deals with the variety and nature of errors that exist on voter rolls, exposing it to methodological issues such as reconciliation of errors in both surveys used in the study, the latter is also affected by issues such as a lack of uniform data standards across different stakeholders. With differing approaches taken by the Election Commission of India and State Election Commissions clubbed with a duplicity of efforts in terms of maintaining different rolls for urban local body elections, scalability sees several challenges. This is an issue flagged by JCCD in the past as well and also finds a mention in the 20th Law Commission of India's recent report on electoral reforms.



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