
May 2018
About Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship and Democracy

Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship and Democracy (Janaagraha) is a Bengaluru based not-for-profit institution that is a part of the Jana group. Janaagraha’s mission is to transform quality of life in India’s cities and towns. It defines quality of life as comprising quality of infrastructure and services and quality of citizenship. To achieve its mission, Janaagraha works with citizens to catalyse active citizenship in city neighbourhoods and with governments to institute reforms to City-Systems. You can read more about Janaagraha at www.janaagraha.org
## List of Abbreviations/Acronyms

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<th>Abbreviation/Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Assembly Constituency</td>
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<tr>
<td>AERO</td>
<td>Assistant Electoral Registration Officer</td>
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<td>AVM</td>
<td>Area Voter Mitra</td>
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<td>BLA</td>
<td>Booth Level Agent</td>
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<td>BLO</td>
<td>Booth Level Officer</td>
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<td>BLV</td>
<td>Booth Level Volunteer</td>
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<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Electoral Officer</td>
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<td>CIVIL</td>
<td>Citizens’ Initiative for Voters’ ID List</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civic Society Organization</td>
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<td>DEO</td>
<td>District Election Officer</td>
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<td>ECI</td>
<td>Election Commission of India</td>
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<td>EPIC</td>
<td>Elector’s Photo Identity Card</td>
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<td>ERMS</td>
<td>Electoral Roll Management System</td>
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<td>ERO</td>
<td>Electoral Registration Officer</td>
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<td>FA</td>
<td>Field Associate</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>PURE</td>
<td>Proper Urban Electoral Rolls</td>
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<td>RPA</td>
<td>Representation of the People Act</td>
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<td>State Enhanced Electoral Roll System</td>
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**Part 1: Janaagraha’s work on the field to improve the accuracy of the voter**

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

India is by far the world's largest democracy. It represents the needs and wants of over a billion of the world's citizens, that is, every seventh human that inhabits our planet. It is also one of the most multicultural corners of the world. It is home to numerous different cultures, languages and religions, which co-exist side-by-side.

The Indian constitution, which was adopted in 1950, is believed to be one of the world’s most detailed, complex and lengthy constitutions. It has been amended more than 120 times, which reflects India’s efforts in building a strong and integrated society based on a plurality of people’s voices.

Elections are a key ingredient of a representative democracy. Through elections, government officials obtain citizens’ support to direct the country towards particular goals; governments, thus, receive their legitimate democratic mandate this way. Moreover, by being elected by the people, governments are accountable for their conduct and fulfilling what they have pledged to. Flaws in the election process deny people their right to participate legitimately and voice their views and opinion in matters that directly concern their life.

A first step towards conducting fair and just elections is to have clear, accurate, and undistorted electoral rolls – the proper listing of all those eligible to vote in a particular area. Indeed, it can be argued that many electoral misconducts, and the subsequent distortions of citizens’ demands, are made possible through inaccurate electoral rolls. Thus, in order for legislations to reflect the people’s opinions in the most objective and inclusive manner, they must be based on an error-free list of eligible voters.

Over the last two decades, Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship and Democracy (Janaagraha) has come to learn that the electoral rolls in urban India are not well maintained and in fact are riddled with errors. During Lok Sabha elections in 2014, the lakhs of voters in Mumbai, Nagpur and Pune who were missing from voter lists, and hence denied the right to vote, were well documented in the media. Furthermore, in Nagaland, polling stations are alleged to have had a voter turn-out greater than 100% while Bangalore Rural received allegations of the illegal enrollment of over 25,000 residents of Tamil Nadu as voters in their constituency.

The Election Commission of India (ECI)—custodians of the voter lists—have acknowledged issues and have tried to undertake a clean-up drive using Aadhaar which was stopped in light of a Supreme Court order forbidding it. More recently they also initiated the National Electoral Roll Purification drive. However, despite these efforts, reports of issues remain—for example, the 263-year-old voter in Ludhiana in the run up to state elections in Punjab in 2017 as well as reports of misspelt names, incorrect address, wrong photos on election identity cards and duplicated names in Pune last year.

Furthermore, just this year, 2018, in the run up to the Karnataka Assembly elections, a study has found that the data on Karnataka voters is officially accessible from four links but unfortunately, the data


available from all four links is different. The quality of voter lists has been repeatedly called into question by such reports, particularly in an urban context.

Current processes and systems for voter list management are not capable of guaranteeing accurate voter lists in urban areas. This document serves to outline Janaagraha’s efforts in ensuring the maintenance of proper urban electoral rolls in India since 2002 in terms of both on-ground campaigns and research work.

1.2 Electoral Rolls and maintenance processes
This section outlines the processes involved in electoral roll maintenance as they are currently constituted in India. This includes the hierarchy of officials involved in the preparation of the rolls as well as the mechanisms for revisions and updation.

1.2.1 Hierarchy of Officials Involved in Preparation of the Electoral Rolls

**Article 324** of the Indian Constitution lays down that the superintendence, directions and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls for all elections to the Parliament and to the Legislative Assembly of every State shall be vested in the Election Commission of India (ECI).

**Section 13A** of the Representation of the People Act (RPA), 1950, provides that the ECI shall designate or nominate, in consultation with the State Government, a Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) for each State/Union Territory. The CEO shall supervise the preparation and revision of electoral rolls of all the constituencies in the State.

Under the CEO, each district shall have an officer of Government appointed as a District Election Officer (DEO). Normally, the District Collectors, District Magistrates and Deputy Commissioners can be designated as DEOs of their districts. The DEO shall coordinate and supervise the preparation and the revision of electoral rolls for all parliamentary and assembly constituencies (Ref. **Section 13AA**).

According to **Section 13B** of the Representation of the People Act, the electoral roll for each constituency in the State shall be prepared and revised by an Electoral Registration Officer (ERO). Normally, the civil service officials and revenue officials of Tehsildar level are appointed as EROs for the Assembly Constituencies within their respective jurisdiction. Section 13C of the Representation of the People Act provides for the appointment of one or more persons as Assistant Electoral Registration Officers (AERO) to assist the EROs in the performance of their functions.

The ERO shall appoint the Designated Officers under **Rule 14** of the Registration of Electors (RE) Rules, 1960. The Designated Officer shall:

- Maintain in duplicate a list of claims in Form 9 (objections to particulars in entries), a list of objections to the inclusion of the names in Form 10 (notice of hearing of a claim) and a list of objections to particulars in Form 11 (Notice to the objector on the hearing of an objection against the inclusion of a name)
- Keep a copy of each such list displayed on a notice board in his office

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• Receive claims and objections and forward them to the ERO.

The DEOs, in consultation with the EROs of the AC, shall appoint Booth Level Officers (BLOs) and Supervisors under Section 13 B (2) of the RPA, 1950 to facilitate the revision of rolls. BLOs are a representative of the ECI at the grass-roots level and collect actual field information with regards to the polling area assigned to him. They essentially undertake a door-to-door verification of the electoral roll6.

Each BLO shall have one or two polling station area under their jurisdiction. The following governmental employees may be appointed as BLOs – Teachers, Anganwadi workers, Patwari/Amin/Lekhpal, Panchayat Secretary, Village Level Workers, Electricity Bill Readers, Postmen, Auxiliary Nurses & Midwives, Health workers, Midday meal workers, Contract teachers, Corporation Tax Collectors, and Clerical Staff in Urban area. BLOs should generally be voters in the polling station where they are deputed as BLOs. Teachers should be drafted minimally as BLOs. However, where necessary, they should be drafted for BLO work during holidays and after duty hours so as not to cause loss of academic work. During the continuous updation period, BLOs may be used for identification of deceased and shifted voters.

At the time of writing, BLOs are paid a fixed component of Rs.6,000/- per annum for those BLOs who have only one part (polling station) assigned to them. Those BLOs who have more than one part will get an additional honorarium of Rs.750/- per part per annum.

According to the provisions of Section 13 CC of RPA, 1950, all the officers referred to above or any other officer or staff employed in connection with preparation, revision and correction of electoral roll shall be deemed to be on deputation to ECI for the period for which they are so employed and shall be subject to control, superintendence and discipline of the ECI.

1.2.2 Types of Electoral Roll Revision Undertaken by the ECI
There are four kinds of revision of the Electoral Roll which are possible by the ECI:

1. **Intensive Revision**: The Commission orders an intensive revision on a periodic basis. It consists of an enumerator, namely a BLO, visiting each house to collect the particulars of the eligible voters. On the basis of such enumeration, draft rolls are prepared de-novo and published, inviting claims and objections. After disposal of such claims and objections, the rolls are finally published.

2. **Summary Revisions**: Undertaken every year. The existing roll is published in draft (usually in September), thus, inviting claims and objections (until January when the Mother roll is to be published). After disposing the claims and objections, the rolls are finally published.

3. **Partly Intensive and Partly Summary Revisions**: The existing rolls are published in draft, and simultaneously, BLOs are sent to the households for verification. After disposing of claims and objections, supplementary lists of addition, deletions and corrections are prepared and published, together with the Mother roll.

4. **Special Revisions**: Ordered in case of any inaccuracies in the rolls. It may be in the form of any of the three revisions described above.

The final Mother Roll, which is reached through all the revisions and draft editions, is always published in January.

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1.2.3 Continuous Updation of Rolls

Besides the above-mentioned specific revisions, there is also a provision for continuous updation of the rolls in the period when no other revision of rolls is under way. The electoral registration system in India, as per the 1950 law, is essentially in the nature of a continuous updation, even though this is not widely known or utilized except during the periods when elections are held.7

Indeed, sections 23 & 24 of the RPA, 1950, claim that the applications for inclusions/deletions/modifications of names in the roll can be submitted at any time after the final publication of electoral roll. All applications received in a calendar month should be dealt with during the next month and the manuscript should be prepared by 25th of that month. By 7th of the following month, one copy of the manuscript should be transferred to the DEO for data entry in the computerized working copy of the electoral roll. The data entered shall be stored in the computerized database for printing at the time of next draft publication of electoral rolls. The updation process is a continuous ongoing process and there is no last date for filing an application under Section 22 or 23, except that it cannot be acted upon when an election is in progress in the constituency and the bar under Section 23(3) becomes operative.

1.3 The genesis of Janaagraha’s interest in the maintenance of the Electoral Rolls

In wanting to create formal platforms for citizens for consultative engagements in government decision-making (Area Sabhas), Janaagraha ‘stumbled upon’ the driver to look deeper into the maintenance of electoral rolls. Given the ‘lowest’ unit of participation within an electoral constituency is a polling booth, Janaagraha wanted to establish these polling booths as legitimate, formal spaces, defined in terms of constitution, composition, functions, duties and responsibilities, through which every registered voter in a polling station has a formal voice. This granular layer was already well constructed in rural areas through the Gram Sabha and Gram Panchayat but was missing in urban decentralisation. There was no provision within the Municipal Corporation Act that there should be such a process in place for citizen participation.

In order to create form platforms in urban areas for citizen participation, Janaagraha turned to voter lists as the ‘data’ of who the people within each polling booth would be – to see whom they could engage. This is when they came to realise that the voter list was not a clear reflection of the people within a polling booth at all.

Relatedly, while undertaking a programme on urban poor in 2002-2003, voter list issues started to come to light. Janaagraha colleagues were researching the Benefits that Reach Urban Poor with a Goal of Poverty Reduction, related to the Government’s Swarna Jyanti Shahari Rozgar Yogana (SJSRY) Scheme. By trying to establish how to identify the urban poor, how to encounter them and mobilise them and understand what platforms to set up for them to have access to decision making, Janaagraha noticed issues with the voter list. In essence, Janaagraha quickly realised there was a very weak relatedness between the poor citizens on the area voter lists, and the poor citizens actually living in the areas.

On a more personal note, after the Karnataka State elections in 2003, Janaagraha’s founders, Ms. Swati Ramanathan and Mr. Ramesh Ramanathan began to question low urban voter turnouts in elections. They questioned whether it was really just down to voter apathy or was there more at play? Furthermore, after returning to India from the USA, Ms. Swati Ramanathan had her first chance to vote in the national elections in 2004. She had applied to be on the list but her name was not on it. Despite trying

to rectify the situation, she was ultimately unable to vote. She also realised she was not alone and there were many other citizens in her situation. It was another driver to uncover the issues with the voter list and its management.

In fact, after this happened, Ms. Swati Ramanathan and Mr. Ramesh Ramanathan decided to do a door-to-door pilot to find out how accurate the voter list was. This was done through the communities in Padmanabhanagar of Uttarahalli Assembly Constituency in Polling Part 781. As the voter lists were not publically available, they compiled a list from scratch for the Polling Part. They asked citizens whether they had a voter card, whether they had voted etc. They met many citizens and had rich conversations about the importance of voting and democracy. This was done prior to the General Elections of 2004. The Polling Part had 1,559 voters across 490 households and it was found that about 35% of the details required correction or up-gradation. This was Janaagraha’s first foray into investigating the quality and maintenance of the voter list. This led to a series of formal programmes led by Janaagraha on the field on improving the accuracy of the voter list and improving the processes involved in list maintenance. In turn Janaagraha has also led a series of research projects trying to objectively measuring the quality of voter lists at city-level across India as well as researching issues in list maintenance processes across Indian cities. This document provides an overview of all of Janaagraha’s work in these domains and is split into two parts reflecting the work done:

1. Janaagraha’s work on the field to actually improve the accuracy of the voter list by improved processes in list maintenance
2. Janaagraha’s research work aiming to objectively measure the quality of voter lists as well as researching issues in list maintenance processes.

1.4 Clean electoral rolls and Janaagraha’s mission

Clean electoral rolls can be seen in direct relation to Janaagraha’s ambition; to improve the quality of life in Indian cities and towns. Janaagraha believes that quality of life is as a direct result of the city-systems which underpin four key areas:

1. Urban Planning and Design
2. Urban Capacities and Resources
3. Empowered and Legitimate Political Representation
4. Transparency, Accountability and Participation

Janaagraha believes that to fix the quality of life in cities and towns, the city-systems which underpin these four areas need to be fixed. Within this framework, the work of clean urban voter lists results directly out of the ‘Empowered and Legitimate Political Representation’ aspect of city-systems. In essence, citizen votes should equate to legitimate political representation. Poor maintenance of voter lists in cities impedes this link.
PART 1: Janaagraha’s work on the field to improve the accuracy of the voter list

Introduction
In response to the electoral roll issues identified and in trying to improve ‘Empowered and Legitimate Representation’ within its city-systems framework, Janaagraha has launched a number of programmes aimed at understanding issues with, and, revising and correcting the electoral rolls, as well as designing better processes for maintenance of the rolls. Namely and by chronological order, these programs and processes are:


These programs will be elaborated in the following sections.

Citizens’ Initiative for Voters’ ID List (CIVIL)
Following an informal pilot done by Ms. Swati Ramanathan and Mr. Ramesh Ramanthan in Padmanabhanagar (Uttarahalli Assembly Constituency) which found 35% of voter details required correction or up-gradation, there was a desire to do a more formal analysis of the quality of the voter list.

In 2005, Janaagraha established a formal partnership with the ECI through the CIVIL project. The initiative was also part of VoteIndia, a national campaign for political reforms which was spearheaded by Lok Satta. CIVIL’s aim was to correct the voter list for the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) as a short term measure, keeping in mind the Local Council elections which were to be held in November that year. Essentially, the objective was to examine the accuracy of the polling sections within voting parts, the accuracy of house numbers, as well as of enumeration of voters, and to capture Elector’s Photo Identity Card (EPIC) numbers in the voter list.

The process examined booth maps and electronic voters’ list, thereafter aiming at the standardisation and the initial analysis of the list. At the heart of the program however, was to look towards a long term solution for voter list management through the Area Sabha where the voter list would be updated on a regular basis. The idea would be to bring the voter list to the citizen’s door step so s/he can access it any point in time, rather than looking at it only during the time of elections.

Sri TS. Krishnamurthy, Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) at the time, came to cut the ribbon on the inauguration of the programme on 15th April, 2005. The project was run in Bengaluru’s Rajajinagar ward supported by the councillor at the time, Mr. N L Narendra Babu. In total in Rajajinagar there were 29 booths and 32,631 registered voters.
Mr. Ramesh Ramanathan & Jay Prakash Narayana at the press conference for the CIVIL launch (2005)

Sri. TS Krishnamurthy completing the first CIVIL form with Jaya Prakash Narayana (2005)
The campaign was executed through 200 trained volunteers who conducted an on-field door-to-door survey collecting the self-reported voter list status details of citizens, which were later cross-verified with voter lists provided by the ECI. To aid their work, volunteers were given resident forms, volunteer survey forms, maps, instruction sheets and FAQs for their disposal. Following this, there was analysis and reporting, a review with the ECI, and inclusion, as well as deletion of names in the voters’ list.
Swati and Ramesh training MS Ramaiah students to undertake CIVIL (2005)
CIVIL examined the accuracy of the list in 16 booths and found that out of the 18,688 names on the voter lists, only 9,228 were found correct, which pointed to an error rate of 50.6%. The list also required additions of 2993 names. Other findings from CIVIL were –

- Names of voters from the same house were listed in different houses
- Single houses appeared in different sections
- Names did not include house number
- Most of the voters had an EPIC (80%)
- There was no link between the voter list and the EPIC card numbers
- About 650 Form-6s (Request for inclusion of name on the list) were received from voters whose names were already in the list
- There were inconsistencies in booth jurisdictions.

As a result of the work done on CIVIL, Janaagraha theorized why the error rate was so high. Migrations, non-deletion of names, no proper mechanism to cross verify the list, and low awareness of citizens (about all issues from where to go to register, whether they are on the list, etc.) were named as some of the urban electoral roll issues.

As a result of CIVIL a two-part solution to the issues it came across was suggested:

**Part A**: A door-to-door survey as an immediate option (i.e. continuous updation door-to-door).

**Part B** further divided into:

- A short term plan: which laid down recommendations, such as Permanent information & EPIC issue centers, bringing together all the names of a household, and usage of maps with clear cut
booth jurisdictions which citizens could physically visit to inquire about their voting status and other details about their voter registration.

- **A long term plan:**
  - Smart cards, which hold voters’ permanent numbers and are individualised and tamper proof.
  - Constituting Area Sabhas, the urban equivalent to the Gram Sabha, as a platform for local issues; bringing the issue down to the lowest unit.

Nothing was formally taken forward from the CIVIL project with the ECI and it in effect went into hibernation. Janaagraha however, continued to try to engage with the state on the advocacy agenda for improved quality of voter lists. When Mr. Ramaseshan became Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) in Karnataka in September 2006, addressing the voter list management technology became high on the agenda. Mr. Ramaseshan felt that the answer to improved voter lists lay with technology and this is what led to the State Enhanced Electoral Roll System (STEERS) project in 2006-7.

**State Enhanced Electoral Roll System (STEERS)**

The STEERS project (2006-7), studied the actual process of electoral roll maintenance as done by the government. The goal of STEERS was to enhance the process of electoral roll maintenance through technology, and this work was done in partnership with the Research & Development (R&D) team at Microsoft. It was through Mr. Ramaseshan, CEO Karnataka (September 2006- February 2008) that Janaagraha developed the partnership with Microsoft. Mr. Ramaseshan felt the answer to improved voter lists lay with technology. The idea of the project was for Microsoft to create an Electoral Roll Management System (ERMS), an automation software, and for Janaagraha to undertake outreach i.e. to encourage people to use the new system.

It was decided that any new electoral roll management process should address the issue of the absence of a detailed map depicting demarcation of Assembly Constituencies (ACs) and part numbers, as well as a rigid information system on the AC and the part number to which a citizen belongs to. Moreover, when studying the process of list maintenance, it was found that the barriers for citizen involvement are high, as the processes for voter inclusion/deletion/modification require physical visits to selected locations that are not well advertised, and access to information about the status of the request is highly limited. The whole process was found to be inadequately controlled and monitored and that a consolidated list of requests received physically was not available with the ERO/AERO. Furthermore, data was poorly managed, the process was often not standardized, commonly interrupted with unacceptable procedures, and little attention was given to the systematic storage of data.

STEERS, thus, sought to redesign the procedure for recording and maintaining voter particulars. The procedures STEERS focused on were:

- Enumeration, meaning a collection and ordered listing of all of eligible voters
- Draft publication of the list
- Deciding on inclusions, deletions and alterations
- Final publication of the roll.

The guiding ideas of STEERS to enhance the above-mentioned procedures were:

- Polling part numbers of the roll needed to be rationalized to avoid exclusion and improve verification
- Information must be made easily available and citizen involvement facilitated
- Better process control, data management and security features ought to be adopted.
All of the aforementioned goals, STEERS suggested, were to be reached through radical and paradigmatic changes in database architecture, connectivity, storage protocols, and in the process adopted for managing the electoral roll.

Electoral roll management, as suggested by STEERS, consisted of the underlying software system and the procedures for handling amends within this system. Essentially the Electoral Roll Management System should be the underlying software system to be hosted within ERO offices to support the processes involved in managing the electoral roll by providing an easy interface for various stakeholders. Additionally, there should be defined procedures to handle inclusions, objections, modifications, and transpositions requests on a regular basis, as well as the corrections of errors and anomalies on periodic basis.

The implementation of the STEERS project was proposed in the following three stages:

1. Pre pilot: A pre-pilot implementation to test the software and establish a strong team of personnel. Thus, the pre-pilot stage would address all the IT related issues and identifies future training requirements.
2. Pilot project: This stage would identify techniques to leverage on the modified process to enhance the quality of the roll. Through this stage, STEERS would cover about a quarter of the voter population of Karnataka.
3. Full implementation: This implementation would cover all the remaining ACs in Karnataka. At the end of this stage, the new process would be in place and would have stabilised, thus, the task of identifying anomalies and ineligible entries in the roll would be an ongoing one.

The idea was that after the project was successfully implemented and scaled across India, it would be possible to use continuous updating as the vehicle to maintain the roll throughout the year.

Following a pilot in Hossur, Microsoft took the project forward directly with the ECI (without Janaagraha) and entered into a commercial contract with them.

JAAGO RE!

In 2007, while continuing to work on understanding electoral roll list maintenance, Mr. Ramesh Ramanathan and Ms. Swati Ramanathan saw an advert on TV done by Tata Tea. The advert was trying to hit the issue of political apathy in terms of voting amongst the youth. In an informal Yuva-Janaagraha poll amongst Bengaluru’s youth before the 2008 Karnataka assembly elections, only 22% had registered on Bengaluru’s electoral rolls, and a mere 8% knew how many elections they could vote to. Based on the research, reason for these catastrophic statistics lay in three major areas:

1. Youth’s lack of interest
2. Lack of voting awareness
3. Procedural hurdles.

To that end, the Tata Tea advert struck a chord with Mr. Ramesh Ramanathan and Ms. Swati Ramanathan and they believed that the strategy should not be to tell the youth to vote but instead to tell them to register to vote (i.e. hence addressing the issue of why they had not voted). After contacting Tata Tea, Mr. Ramesh Ramanathan and Ms. Swati Ramanathan proposed the idea of a voter registration drive with Tata
Tea as the sponsor. This was the genesis of the Jaago Re! campaign, putting out a call of action to youth for voter registration.

Jaago Re! was a national campaign to encourage the youth to register to vote and was launched in 2008. The campaign aimed to register one-million new voters in a period of 6 months (September 2008 to the parliamentary elections in May 2009), and go on to register the entire eligible population of India for voting in the next 5 years. The target of one million newly registered voters was essentially all who had become eligible to vote since the last election – i.e. all those coming of age.

Sri TS, Krishnamurthy, Mr. Rajeev Chandrashekar & Mr. Ramesh Ramanathan at the launch of Jaago Re! 2007.

The campaign targeted the top 37 cities of India, and it was executed through more than ten partners, the biggest of which was Janaagraha’s media partner – Tata Tea. With these partners, Jaago Re! established an eminent Advisory Board. The members of the Board were as follows:

- Mr. N R Narayananmurthy (Chairman and Chief Mentor, Infosys)
- Mr. Naresh Gupta (Chief Electoral Officer, Tamil Nadu)
- Sri TS Krishnamurthy (ex Chief Election Commissioner of India)
- Mr. Rakeysh Omprakash Mehra (Indian filmmaker and screenwriter) and
- Mr. Tariq Ansari (MD, Mid-Day Multimedia).
- Mr. Prasoon Joshi (Indian lyricist, screenwriter, poet, CEO of McCann Erickson)
Moreover, the campaign was endorsed by the ECI.

The public outreach of Jaago Re! was of an immense scale. For example, the campaign conducted talks and on-the-spot registration drives in 210 top colleges and companies of India in 11 cities. Each of the institutions selected had a minimum youth population of 1000, with a target voter-registration rate of 50% i.e. 500 youth voters per institution.

Phase 1 of the outreach program aimed at creating an assured base of 1 lakh youth voters across these 11 cities. Phase 2 of outreach was organized with an intention to give a final push to youth voter registrations, which closed between January – March 2009.

The uniqueness of this campaign lay in the way the latest advances in Internet and mobile technologies were innovatively used to address the fundamental challenges in the voter registration process. One of the key innovations was the launch of India’s first online voter registration engine (hosted by Janaagraha), which allowed anybody to fill out their voter registration forms online; and took just a few minutes. Moreover, in the 37-targeted cities, the engine had an added feature of a GIS application that helped people locate their constituency and provided driving directions to submit the voter registration form, after marking one's house on the map. Additionally, a mobile phone application allowed youth to register for voting to the Janaagraha online platform through free-of-cost SMS messages.

The campaign resulted in 620,000 voters’ names being submitted to Janaagraha’s voter registration portal. The site itself had 1.5 million hits. Besides impacting immediate voter registration, the campaign was perceived to have a big influence on urban voters, especially the youth. In an IMRB-Business Standard survey conducted in May 2009 among urban youth between 18-29 years of age, 24 percent of those surveyed said that the message of the Jaago Re! campaign had a deep influence on them, greater than any other campaign.

The ECI’s electronic system was, however, unable to absorb all the registered names due to such a high volume within a short period of time. In fact about half of the names did not get registered. This was another indicator that the systems and processes for electoral roll maintenance did not possess the capacity to effectively maintain/record amends in the voter list. It essentially amplified the need for a reforms agenda on the supply side of electoral rolls and this was the main message which was given to the ECI and the Advisory Group following the campaign.

Memorandum of Understanding with the CEO, Karnataka

Following the Jaago Re! campaign, Janaagraha moved the energy to a more local level and a new name was conceived; Jaagte Raho! Early grassroots components in Shanthi Nagar were already in place when earlier, before Jaago Re!, there had been efforts to start standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the BLOs to understand voter list maintenance and associated issues. The Jaagte Raho! campaign was therefore centred in Shanti Nagar and a formal A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed with the CEO, Karnataka.

The MoU was signed on 23rd July, 2010 between the Chief Electoral Officer, Karnataka (Mr. C.S Suranjana) and Janaagraha to take up a pilot project for improving the hygiene of the electoral roll in Shanti Nagar A.C. Shanthi Nagar was chosen to be the pilot constituency as it was the only constituency
in Bengaluru for which there were accurate maps. Furthermore, the State Election Commission (SEC) also opined that Shanthi Nagar had a good geographical location and clear boundaries. Shanthi Nagar is a large constituency comprising of seven wards and 186 polling parts.
Mr. Navin Chawla (CEC, ECI) & Mr. Narayana Murthy with Ms. Swati Ramanathan and Mr. Ramesh Ramanathan at the signing of the original MoU.

On 5th September, 2011, an extension of the MoU was signed with Mr. C.S. Suranjana, CEO Karnataka; the aim of which was to work towards establishing a model framework for management of urban electoral process in Bengaluru using Shantinagar as a pilot AC with the aim of scaling this up.

The work done by Janaagraha as part of the MoUs has been under the banner of Jaagte Raho!
Jaagte Raho!

Introduction
The work done by Janaagraha as part of the MoUs with the ECI has been under the banner of Jaagte Raho! The purpose of the Jaagte Raho! programme was to do a pilot project for improving the hygiene of the electoral roll in Shanthi Nagar AC. This was different to Janaagraha’s CIVIL campaign which sought information on the quality of the list. This time Janaagraha would do the actual list maintenance; not a
one-time thing but the process of keeping the list clean to understand the human infrastructure and process infrastructure of list maintenance.

The model that was developed was for continuous updation which included the mobilisation of citizen volunteers called Area Voter Mitras (AVMs). Two or three Area Voter Mitras were engaged for a polling part (area covered by a polling booth) comprising approximately 500 households to ease the administrative burden of Electoral Roll Officers/Ward offices where requests for voter list changes need to be submitted. AVMs were the single points of contact for voter registration in the neighbourhood.

AVMs in Jaagte Raho! came from a diverse range of backgrounds and belonged to different sections of society. There was no limit on age and no preference was given to those with higher qualifications. Candidates were selected based on their desire to bring about a change in their society and included students, teachers, scientists, businessmen, housewives and senior citizens. The only condition was that candidates had to be non-partisan, i.e. they could not be a supporter or member of any political party.

The model was formalised by Janaagraha in 2012 through the development of a manual documenting the model framework for management of the urban electoral process; the Proper Urban Electoral Rolls (PURE) manual. The process, as applied in Shanthi Nagar has had an impact on form submissions and voter turn-out. The programme as it ran is documented below starting from the learnings from the early work in doing list maintenance in Shanthi Nagar.

Learnings from the early Jaagte Raho! work
In executing their work on the ground, the Jaagte Raho! team made a number of observations with regards to the electoral roll maintenance processes as they are currently constituted in India. Currently, voter lists are updated on an annual basis, generally during a 3 month window from November to January. Although continual updation is possible all-year-round by citizens submitting the required changes to their details, in reality this process is not widely known nor is it operationally working in the best way.

One of the primary issues encountered was a lack of sufficient human resources to update voter lists properly, from the ECI’s perspective. This is specifically because updating voter lists during the short updation window is carried out by employees of municipal corporations (mainly tax and revenue inspectors) and school teachers all fulfilling the role of Booth Level Officers (BLOs) at a paltry compensation. In several cases, identified employees do not perform their role in updating voter lists due to poor incentives, lack of clear accountability for this role, disruption in their primary duties and irrational allocation of geographical areas where they need to update lists (e.g. school teachers are assigned neighbourhoods around their school rather than near their residence).

It was felt that the staid and irrational process of periodic updates needed to be replaced with transparent and continuous update of voter lists. The experience of the Jaagte Raho! team revealed an approximate 20% change in voters annually in selected areas of Bengaluru due to migration of 3 kinds - within the city, between cities and from village to city. This is fairly significant and the ECI is unlikely ever to have a sufficient workforce to cope with such change. Further there is a large proportion of neighbourhoods that are slums, semi-formal settlements or informal settlements where density of population is high, notation of addresses incorrect/incomplete/incomprehensible and details of voters difficult to ascertain.

In fact, in general the team noticed the struggle of address verification of voters; addresses in Indian cities include haphazard naming conventions of streets, numbering of doors etc. which are obstacles to proper voter verification and updating of voter lists. As a result of this work, Janaagraha also recommended initiating conversations between the ECI, State Governments, the Postal Department and Municipal Corporations on the steamlining of addresses, naming and numbering conventions. All these agencies are
impacted by the currently poor conventions and would benefit from more efficient and effective standards applied in cities and towns.

As a result of the early observations and experiences, the Jaagte Raho! programme started to work towards establishing a model framework for management of electoral rolls. The result of this was a model for continuous updation of the voter list. This framework was called ‘Process Mapping for Proper Urban Electoral Rolls’ (PURE).


In designing the PURE manual in 2012 it was felt that engagement of local communities and civil society organisations may enhance the capacity of the ECI to tide over the issues in voter list management. The Jaagte Raho! team developed a model for continuous updation which includes the mobilisation of citizen volunteers called Area Voter Mitras (AVMs). This model was instrumental in improving the quality of the voter lists in Shanti Nagar AC and has been the driving force behind the form submissions outlined in the section below. The model proposes engaging 2 or 3 Area Voter Mitras for a polling part (area covered by a polling booth) comprising approximately 500 households to ease the administrative burden of Electoral Roll Officers/Ward offices where requests for voter list changes need to be submitted. AVMs would be the single points of contact for voter registration in the neighbourhood.

Furthermore, the PURE manual advocates for the need for technology improvements to voter list management. This includes:

- Using GIS to map polling part boundaries. Currently most cities and towns do not have credible maps of polling parts.
- Creating automated workflows for online voter registration that permit scanned documents and photographs and digital signatures, thus obviating the need for in-person submission of original documents (which makes the online application for voter registration meaningless)
- Making voting fungible within ACs instead of current rigidity on voter lists at polling part/booth level (i.e. voters at present cannot vote in just any polling booth in the AC, only in the particular polling booth where their names are registered on the voter list)
- Adopting Open Data standards in respect of voter lists, ensure voter lists are maintained, updated and disclosed in data formats that are best-in-class and amenable to integration with other government databases (as against PDF formats) such as gas/other utility subscriptions, National Population Register etc.
- Using hand-held devices with online forms and integrated GIS to update voter lists (backed by hard copy submissions, voter attestations).
Forms submitted during Jaagte Raho!

Janaagraha’s Jaagte Raho! team worked in an on-going manner to establish and maintain the hygiene of the voter list in Shanti Nagar AC in Bengaluru. In the time period from 2011 to 2014, the team submitted close to 120,000 changes to the electoral rolls in Shanti Nagar. Table 1 outlines the form submissions by year. Just under 1000 submissions were also made in 2010.

Initial discussions on Jaagte Raho! with elected representatives from Shanthi Nagar (Mr. NA Haris) constituency.
Launch of Jaagte Raho! 2010

Mr. Narayana Murthy at the launch of Jaagte Raho! 2010
Launch of Jaagte Raho! at the grounds next to the civil court, Palace Road, Bengaluru, 2010
Jaagte Raho on the field
Adverts to mobilise AVMs for Jaagte Raho!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form type</th>
<th>Year 2011 &amp; 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form 6: Inclusion</td>
<td>25,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form 7: Objection</td>
<td>57,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form 8:</td>
<td>9,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form 8A:</td>
<td>4,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>97,484</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 Form 6: Inclusion of name
Form 7: Objection of inclusion of name
Furthermore, the team worked on specific drives to get citizens across Bengaluru’s 26 ACs registered as voters in advance of 2013 Assembly Elections and 2014 Union Elections. Table 2 outlines the form submissions by year related to these drives.

**Table 2: Form types submitted for changes to electoral rolls in all Bengaluru ACs in advance of 2013 and 2014 elections.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Form 6</th>
<th>Form 7</th>
<th>Form 8</th>
<th>Form 8A</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>17,033</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1443</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>84,871</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>11,599</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>97,077</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

__Form 8:__ Correction of entry on roll  
__Form 8A:__ Transposition of entry on roll
6.5 Impact of work done during Jaagte Raho!

A case in point made by the submission of forms in Shanthi Nagar is in relation to the potential impact on voter turnout, and relatedly, margins of victory. In Shanthi Nagar AC, as per official records, the number of eligible voters at the State Assembly Elections in 2009 was 2,10,000 and the voter turnout in this constituency during said elections was recorded at 98,700, i.e. 47%. If however, all the corrections were made to the list, the number should have perhaps been 1,52,893 (not 2,10,000). Furthermore, turnout may have been actually much higher at approximately 64.55%.

A comparison done in 2011 of the margins of victory of the corporators in some wards in Shanthi Nagar in the elections held in 2010 with the number of forms submitted highlights the potential impact of clean voter lists on margins of victory in elections. Table 3 shows a comparison of form submissions with voter turnout in specific wards in Shanthi Nagar. It showcases the fact that a cleaner voter list could have significantly affected the election results. In particular in Shantala Nagar the margin of victory was 212 votes but over 1300 people did not have their franchise. Similarly, the additions, deletions and modifications could also have resulted in a higher voter turnout overall.

Table 3: Comparison of form submissions with voter turnout in specific wards in Shanthi Nagar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward No.</th>
<th>Ward Name</th>
<th>Voter turnout 2010</th>
<th>Margin of Victory</th>
<th>Form 6</th>
<th>Form 7</th>
<th>Form 8</th>
<th>Form 8A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Jogupalya</td>
<td>45.28%</td>
<td>2795</td>
<td>1784</td>
<td>1631</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>1393</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>1041</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>Shantala Nagar</td>
<td>45.67%</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>1393</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>1041</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Domlur</td>
<td>46.56%</td>
<td>2229</td>
<td>2119</td>
<td>1333</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>Agaram</td>
<td>43.97%</td>
<td>1026</td>
<td>2148</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>Vannarpet</td>
<td>43.79%</td>
<td>1294</td>
<td>4074</td>
<td>1465</td>
<td>1420</td>
<td>942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>Neelasandra</td>
<td>40.71%</td>
<td>7331</td>
<td>4691</td>
<td>1848</td>
<td>1209</td>
<td>1313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>Shantinagar</td>
<td>38.69%</td>
<td>8340</td>
<td>3934</td>
<td>2522</td>
<td>2415</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART 2: Janaagraha’s research work on voter lists and processes

1. Introduction

Following a decade of work in the field, in 2012 Janaagraha also started trying to objectively measuring the quality of voter lists in at city-level across India. Objective measures of the state of the voter lists serve to highlight, using valid means, whether there is any block in citizens’ democratic rights. As well as the most obvious and commonly discussed concern of citizens being denied their right to vote, other issues can be explored this way. These include the potential for phantom voting (related potentially to margins of victory in elections) as well as considering the implications on voter turn-out statistics, consequently feeding into debates around voter- apathy in urban centres.

In the journey to measure the quality of voter lists Janaagraha has faced some difficulties. For example, efforts to measure the quality of the lists in Patna and Bengaluru had to be ceased on account of poor address infrastructure and difficulty in reaching out to Booth Level Officers (BLOs). This prompted instead, a focus in research on the processes that lead to the creation of voter lists, one of the most important being the ‘BLO layer’ of functioning. BLOs are the frontline workers of the Election Commission of India (ECI) tasked with collecting data on voters as well as verifying their claims and requests. These officers hold other full-time government jobs as well. Needless to say, any issues within this layer are bound to have an effect on the quality of voter lists. While their importance is evident in the nature of work they undertake and it has been a decade since BLOs came into being, there have not been many studies trying to assess their effectiveness, investigating how well they are working and identifying any leakages that might be afecting the quality of voter lists.

To that end, since 2015, the scope of Janaagraha’s research has expanded to looking into the processes involved in voter list management, in particular the role of the Booth Level Officer (BLO) and reviewing additional resources, primarily websites of Chief Electoral Officers (CEOs), which support the BLO layer to try and paint a better picture of the system of getting enrolled on the voter list, requesting amends to an existing enrolment etc.

This part of this document provides an overview of Janaagraha’s research on voter list management from 2012 to 2017. As well as recording the sampling and methodology on field, this documentation includes an exploration of the nuances and grey areas encountered with the aim of refining the best methods for objectively measuring the quality of the voter list and voter list management processes.
2. Quality of Voter List studies; initial explorations in 2012-2014

2.1 Introduction

Initial explorations to measuring the quality of the voter list began in two Assembly Constituencies (ACs) in Bengaluru, following by a study in Delhi. These studies focused on measuring errors on the voter list. Below is a brief overview of the approach in methodology used in these studies which will be beneficial when reading through the research summaries. Furthermore, it is this methodology which Janaagraha worked to refine in later studies of the quality of voter lists.

In broad terms, the research aimed to measure two types of error on the voter list:

- **Errors of inclusion**: names which should be included on the list but are not there
- **Errors of deletion**: names which are on the list but should not be.

Due to the nature of errors, typically two different methodologies have been used in the studies to capture the extent of these across populations. In basic terms these are:

- **Citizen centric surveys**: which are used to **measure errors of inclusion**. The sampling basis for this survey type is a household and a random adult over 18 within this household. Essentially in this method a citizen is located by household selection and consequently checked against the voter list. In general terms, a citizen is either on the list or not. The latter being an error of inclusion.

- **Voter-list centric surveys**: which are used to **measure errors of deletion**: The sampling basis for this survey type is a citizen name and associated details on the actual voter list. Essentially in this method, the citizen is pre-selected from the voter-list and surveyors try to locate this citizen. In general terms, either a person is found at their address or not. The latter being an error of deletion.

In reality there are some subtle complexities and grey areas in not only the methodologies but also the categorisation of these errors. Janaagraha has been uncovering these complexities in its work which are documented herewith.
2.2 Comparing the quality of the voter list in two Assembly Constituencies in Bangalore (2012)

2.2.1 Introduction
This study aimed to compare the quality of the voter list in two Assembly Constituencies (ACs) in Bangalore; Shantinagar and Hebbal. At the time the study was undertaken, Janaagraha’s Jaagte Raho! team had been working for over a year in Shantinagar to maintain the voter list using the PURE process\(^9\) whereas in Hebbal the only maintenance happening was as standard under the Electoral Commission of India (ECI). The aim therefore was to ascertain the quality of the voter lists in each AC and whether the implementation of the PURE process had improved the quality of the voter list (i.e. fewer errors were present on the electoral roll).

A citizen-centric and a voter-list centric survey were undertaken in each of Shantinagar and Hebbal. The aim of the former being to capture potential additions to the list and the aim of the latter was to capture potential deletions to the list.

2.2.2 Method
- Janaagraha’s Jaagte Raho! team led the project
- Voter-list centric and citizen-centric surveys were done in both ACs
- All interviews were conducted face-to-face using a standard-structured questionnaire
- The fieldwork was conducted in 2012 by Janaagraha’s Jaagte Raho! team.

2.2.3 Sampling\(^{10}\)
2.2.3.1 Voter-list centric
Shantinagar has seven wards within it and 186 polling parts. The voter population of Shantinagar AC in 2012 was 163784. Similar numbers for Hebbal have not been documented. The aim was to achieve responses from 1% of the voting population (just over 1500 respondents) from each AC. For both ACs, within each PP, eight random names were selected from the voter list and these were the citizens surveyed.

2.2.3.2 Citizen centric
The methodology for this was the same in both ACs and as per the voter-list centric survey. However, in place of selecting names from the voter list, for the citizen centric survey, the sampling basis was citizens within household. The eight citizens from each PP were therefore selected as follows:

- A landmark within each PP was selected as a starting point.
- Surveyors then used the ‘right hand rule’ of household selection, using a random number table (to generate an ‘n’), by counting off the houses down the nearest street and selecting every ‘nth’ house until eight surveys were achieved.

Table 1 shows the numbers of citizens interviewed for each survey type and within each AC.

---


\(^{10}\) Better maps were available for Shantinagar as compared with Hebbal so sampling was easier in the former.
### Table 1: Number of citizens surveyed for each survey type and within each AC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AC</th>
<th>Survey type</th>
<th>Citizen-centric</th>
<th>Voter list-centric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shantinagar</td>
<td>Citizen-centric</td>
<td>1472</td>
<td>1472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebbal</td>
<td>Citizen-centric</td>
<td>1744</td>
<td>1744</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.2.4 Error Categorisations

The voter-list centric surveys measured potential **errors of deletion**. Included in these were:

- Citizens who were dead
- Citizens who had shifted from the address
- Citizens whose house could not be found

The citizen-centric surveys measured potential **errors of inclusion**. This included those citizens who were approached but were not on the voter list. Related to this, there is some debate about citizens who are on the list, but with errors on their details, and whether they can be included in this bucket or not.

There are two ways these errors can be conceptualized:

1. Errors of inclusion should only constitute those citizens who are not on the voter list. Termed **outright errors of inclusion** from now on, for the benefit of clarity.
2. Errors of inclusion should include those citizens who are not on the voter list but also those citizens who are on the voter list but with errors. Termed **covert errors of inclusion** from now on, for the benefit of clarity.

Given this debate, the **voter-list centric** surveys could also potentially capture **covert errors of inclusion** in the form of citizens who are on the voter list with errors which prevent them from voting. This is discussed in more detail below in the ‘Discussion’ section.

### 2.2.5 Findings

#### 2.2.5.1 Voter-list centric

Table 2 shows the percentage breakdown of correct entries on the voter lists in the two ACs using the voter-list centric methodology. This shows that within Shantinagar AC, only 25% of the sample of citizens from the voter list showed errors of deletion while this was more than double in Hebbal at 53%.

### Table 2: Breakdown of entries on the voter lists in Shantinagar and Hebbal*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Citizen resident at address &amp; no errors with their details</th>
<th>Citizen resident at address but errors with their details</th>
<th>Citizen not resident at address (errors of deletion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shantinagar</td>
<td>58% (n=857)</td>
<td>17% (n=251)</td>
<td>25% (n=364)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebbal**</td>
<td>27% (n=475)</td>
<td>20% (n=346)</td>
<td>53% (n=923)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 shows the deletions category further broken down by the error types discovered. This shows the main variance in the errors of deletion in Shantinagar and Hebbal can be explained by ‘address not found’ errors which are considerably higher in Hebbal than Shantinagar.

The Jaagte Raho! team have reported that it took them approximately six months to become familiar with the infrastructure (i.e. where different streets/houses etc. were) in Shantinagar. This suggests that the difference in errors due to addresses not being found, may not necessarily be valid errors of deletion but simply, an inability to find the addresses listed in Hebbal as the teams have not been working in this area. There are strong grounds therefore to suggest that ‘address not found’ outcomes cannot be considered as errors of deletion on the voter list without further explorations. The address not being found is a reoccurring concept in the other research studies outlined in this document and raises an important additional layer of issue with the electoral rolls.

If the address not found deletions are omitted from the analysis\textsuperscript{11}, the overall errors of deletion change to 14\% in Shantinagar and 25\% in Hebbal, maintaining proportionally higher error rate in Hebbal as compared with Shantinagar where the Jaagte Raho! team had been working. It is important to see these findings with some caution given that the omission of substantial citizens (i.e. those with an outcome of an ‘address not found’ – more than a third of the sample in the case of Hebbal) significantly reduces the representation of the samples being used.

### Table 3: Breakdown of errors of deletion in Shantinagar and Hebbal\textsuperscript{*}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Overall errors of deletion</th>
<th>Shifted</th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Address not found</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shantinagar</td>
<td>25% (n=364)</td>
<td>11% (n=165)</td>
<td>1% (n=11)</td>
<td>13% (n=188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebbal</td>
<td>53% (n=923)</td>
<td>15% (n=257)</td>
<td>1% (n=22)</td>
<td>37% (n=644)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{*}All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer

Any errors of details of those citizens on the list were captured and Table 4 below summarises these. It can be seen that there is little difference between the two ACs with regards to the error types which were found with citizens’ details on the electoral rolls except for errors relating to address. Proportionally there seem to be twice as many of these error types in Hebbal (8\%) as compared with Shantinagar (4\%) where the Jaagte Raho! team had been working. Errors with name, father/husband/mother’s name and address are the most common error types reported. There are only very few incidence of the wrong age, sex or photo being listed on the rolls.

\textsuperscript{11}I.e., percentage of errors are calculated out of the total sample minus ‘address not found’ outcomes; revised total n=1284 for Shantinagar and n=1100 for Hebbal.
Table 4: Error types found with citizen details on the electoral roll (% of overall sample*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Father/Husband/Mother’s name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Photo mismatch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shantinagar</td>
<td>7% (n=102)</td>
<td>5% (n=80)</td>
<td>4% (n=63)</td>
<td>1% (n=14)</td>
<td>&lt;1% (n=6)</td>
<td>&lt;1% (n=2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebbal</td>
<td>6% (n=98)</td>
<td>6% (n=96)</td>
<td>8% (n=131)</td>
<td>1% (n=14)</td>
<td>&lt;1% (n=4)</td>
<td>&lt;1% (n=3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer. Furthermore, citizens may have reported more than one error type so may be counted in more than one category.

2.2.5.2 Citizen centric

There was an 8% difference in the proportion of registered voters found between Shantinagar (71%) and Hebbal (63%) as Table 5 shows. Citizens were therefore more likely to be registered to vote in the AC where the Jaagte Rahol team were working.

Table 5: Proportion of registered and non-registered voters on the list (% of overall sample*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Registered on the voter list</th>
<th>Not registered on the voter list</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shantinagar</td>
<td>71% (n=1046)</td>
<td>29% (n=426)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebbal</td>
<td>63% (n=1104)</td>
<td>37% (n=640)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer.

Those citizens who were registered on the voter list were asked how many times they had to register before their registration was successful. Of those citizens who were registered, proportionally fewer had to try to register more than once in Hebbal to get on the list as compared with citizens in Shantinagar (22% had to try more than once in Hebbal compared with 31% in Shantinagar – see Table 6). However, it must be remembered that 8% fewer citizens were registered in the first place in Hebbal which may account for some of this variance.

Table 6: Proportion of registration attempts before successful registration on voter list (% of those successfully registered on the voter list)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>1 time</th>
<th>2 times</th>
<th>3 times</th>
<th>4 times</th>
<th>5 times</th>
<th>6 times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shantinagar**</td>
<td>69% (n=726)</td>
<td>25% (n=257)</td>
<td>4% (n=46)</td>
<td>1% (n=10)</td>
<td>&lt;1% (n=1)</td>
<td>&lt;1% (n=2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebbal</td>
<td>78% (n=864)</td>
<td>16% (n=181)</td>
<td>5% (n=50)</td>
<td>1% (n=8)</td>
<td>0% (n=0)</td>
<td>&lt;1% (n=1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer.

** Four citizens who were registered on the list were not asked how many times they had to attempt to register before they were successful. Hence the ‘n’ for Shantinagar is 1042 instead of 1046. Percentages are still expressed out of 1046.

Of those who were not registered on the list, 170 citizens (40%) had completed a registration form in Shantinagar and 200 citizens (31%) had completed a form in Hebbal. Table 7 shows how many times these citizens had completed a registration form. The pattern of attempted registrations is very similar amongst the two ACs though it must be remembered that proportionally more citizens overall in Hebbal were not registered on the list.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>1 time</th>
<th>2 times</th>
<th>3 times</th>
<th>4 times</th>
<th>5 times</th>
<th>6 times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Shantinagar | 5 citizens were not asked whether they had completed a registration form despite not being registered on the voter list. The percentage quoted is out of all 426 citizens who were not registered to vote.

44
When exploring the demographic of citizens who have attempted to register but have not succeeded, the data shows an interesting pattern. Table 8 shows, by household type, the proportion of citizens who were unsuccessful in registering their name on the electoral roll. In Shantinagar, where the Jaagte Raho! team have been working, the breakdown of unsuccessful registrations is distributed more regularly across household types than in Hebbal. Although patterns should be cautiously attributed due to low numbers of respondents within each category, there appears to be a larger proportional failure rate in registration in lower-grade housing in Hebbal compared with Shantinagar and a lower failure rate in more high-end housing. The only notable exception to the pattern is in Household type 5; Apartment for single family/self. In both ACs, this is the household type with the highest rate of failure to get registered on the electoral roll despite trying at least once and in some instances, multiple times.

Table 8: Proportion of citizens unsuccessful in registering their name on the electoral role by household type (% of those who have tried, unsuccessfully, to register within each household type*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household type13</th>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shantinagar</td>
<td>10% (n=8)</td>
<td>14% (n=44)</td>
<td>11% (n=1)</td>
<td>13% (n=59)</td>
<td>22% (n=18)</td>
<td>15% (n=14)</td>
<td>14% (n=26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hebbal</td>
<td>27% (n=6)</td>
<td>17% (n=40)</td>
<td>20% (n=1)</td>
<td>17% (n=77)</td>
<td>38% (n=33)</td>
<td>3% (n=3)</td>
<td>10% (n=40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer. All cells have an n<100 and therefore be interpreted with some caution.

Overall, the vast majority of citizens within both Shantinagar and Hebbal had tried to register themselves on the voter list at least once, though a proportionally more citizens tried in Shantinagar (83%, n=1216) as compared with Hebbal (75%, n=1304).

Citizens who were registered on the list, were asked to verify the details listed for them and indicate whether there were any errors on these details. As Table 9 shows, the most common error reported was related to the name, followed by citizens being listed in the wrong polling booth. Overall, in Shantinagar (where the Jaagte Raho! team have been working), 25% of citizens (n=266)14 registered to vote, had errors with their registration compared with 42% (n=466) in Hebbal - a considerably larger proportion.

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13 Household type 1-7 extends from Self-Built/Informal Housing/Shack/Squatter Settlement (type 1) through to a free Standing House (Single Family) (type 7).
14 There were 21 citizens in Shantinagar and 3 in Hebbal who said there were no errors with their registration but specific errors have been coded for these citizens in the data set. For the benefit of doubt, these citizens have been counted without errors.
Table 9: Error types found with citizen details on the electoral roll (% of those registered on the voter list*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Shifted</th>
<th>Repeated</th>
<th>Listed in wrong polling booth</th>
<th>Name (or other) contains error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shantinagar</td>
<td>&lt;1% (n=4)</td>
<td>1% (n=7)</td>
<td>7% (n=72)</td>
<td>18% (n=188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebbal</td>
<td>1% (n=8)</td>
<td>&lt;1% (n=5)</td>
<td>8% (n=86)</td>
<td>34% (n=378)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer. Furthermore, citizens may have reported more than one error type so may be counted in more than one category – 7 citizens in Shantinagar and 11 in Hebbal respectively reported more than one error type.

Out of those citizens who were not registered to vote and who had not tried to do so in Shantinagar, the majority 87% (n=218 out of 251) were in actual fact interested to register. Out of those 218 citizens, 70% (n=152) did not know the procedure to vote while 22% (n=48) did and 8% (n=18) did not answer/were not asked the question. Of those who did not know the procedure, the vast majority (93%, n=141) would be interested to register if they were told the procedure. The picture was similar in Hebbal. Out of those not registered and who had not tried (n=440), 91% (n=401) were interested to be registered but it appears again that a large barrier was lack of knowledge about how to do so; 78%, n=313 out of those we were interested said this was the case. If told how, all but one of the 313 citizens said they would be interested to register.

The limited number of citizens who were not registered to vote, had not tried and were not interested in doing so had similar reasons for this in both ACs. Citizens indicated that they were only in the area temporarily, were shifting addresses in the near future, they were illiterate, they were registered elsewhere, had time constraints to get registered or were just not interested in voting.

2.2.6 Summary

Key findings from both the voter-list and citizen centric surveys are given below.

2.2.6.1 Voter-list centric

Key findings are as follows:

- Proportionally, the voter list in Hebbal showed more than twice the errors of deletion (53%) as compared with Shantinagar (25%).
- The vast majority of errors of deletion in Hebbal were as a result of the address of the required citizen not being found.
- Where citizens were found at the right address according to the list, there were proportionally fewer errors with the address details of these registrations in Shantinagar as compared with Hebbal.

Table 10 summarises the errors of deletion and inclusion which can be surmised from the voter-list centric surveys.

---

15 11 respondents who should have been asked the question were not, or did not respond. Percentages are calculated out of the total of 251.
Table 10: Errors of deletion and inclusion as surmised from the voter-list centric surveys (% of total population of citizens sampled within each AC)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Errors of deletion</th>
<th>Covert errors of inclusion**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shantinagar</td>
<td>25% (n=364)</td>
<td>17% (n=257)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebbal</td>
<td>53% (n=923)</td>
<td>26% (n=461)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer.

**Includes all those with errors on their registration. If anyone citizen had multiple errors, for this proportional calculation they have only been included once. Errors of ‘repetition’ are not included in covert errors of inclusion.

2.2.6.2 Citizen centric survey

Key findings are as follows:

- Proportionally more citizens were registered on the list in Shantinagar (71%), where the Jaagte Raho! Team were working, as compared with Hebbal (63%).
- The majority of citizens in both ACs had tried to register on the voter list at least once (whether successful or not) though proportionally more citizens had tried in Shantinagar (83%) than Hebbal.
- Out of those who were registered, there were proportionally fewer errors with citizens’ names or other details in Shantinagar (25%) as compared with Hebbal (42%).
- Most citizens who were not registered to vote (in either AC) and had not tried to, were in fact interested in registering but the majority did not know how to do so.

Table 11 summarises the errors of inclusion which can be surmised from the citizen-centric surveys.

Table 11: Errors of inclusion as surmised from the voter-list centric surveys (% of total population of citizens sampled within each AC)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Outright errors of inclusion</th>
<th>Covert errors of inclusion**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shantinagar</td>
<td>29% (n=426)</td>
<td>18% (n=261)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebbal</td>
<td>37% (n=640)</td>
<td>27% (n=473)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer.

** Includes errors with citizens’ details, e.g. name, address and those listed in the wrong polling booth.

2.2.7 Discussion

Whether to include registered voters with errors (in either the list or citizen-centric surveys) as errors of inclusion is not straightforward. Different types of errors on the voter list may in fact potentially lead to either an error of inclusion or an error of deletion. For example, the following list outlines some errors with names/details on the voter list captured in this study and whether they indicate potential deletion or inclusion issues with the electoral roll.

- Citizen duplicated on the list [error of deletion, and in fact, potentially an error of multiple deletion]
- Name/address/gender details incorrect [potential error of inclusion if the error prevents citizen from voting but this may vary dependent on the detail(s) which are wrong]
The potential error of inclusion relating to registered details being incorrect may prevent a citizen from voting but actually is not an error of inclusion in terms of names not physically being on the list at all. Therefore it may not be conceptually correct to include these errors as errors of inclusion. Instead, as these could be errors that could lead to a citizen being unable to vote, they should be labelled as such. If the unit of reference for measuring error in the voter list is the polling part, then the error of a name being registered in the wrong polling booth/area is however, an error of inclusion. At present, this is not how it has been considered.

For a list-centric survey, attempts are made to find a specific citizen at a specific address (exactly as listed on the voter list). Given this, it should not be possible to find a person at the address but then find an error with their address beyond a spelling mistake or component missing from the address. I.e. it should not be possible to find the person actually lives at a different door number but on the same street as the surveyor should have only tried to find them at the specific address listed. It would not be feasible for the surveyor to check every other door on the road or elsewhere for the listed person. Instead, if the person was not at the address specified, this would be considered an error of deletion.

Considering all of the above, there is a need to capture all these nuanced errors and outcome variations within the surveys. Not only that, but where they can be measured in both citizen-centric and voter-list centric (i.e. the errors with registrations), they should be done in the same way for both surveys.

In the Shantinagar/Hebbal study there were some inconsistencies in the registration error options captured in the citizen centric compared with the list-centric survey. On list centric survey, errors were recorded separately for name, age, other half/father name, gender, address and photo. On the citizen centric survey, the options were shifted, repeated, wrong booth, errors with name (or other error). Naturally there are some differences between what could be asked (i.e. shifted and dead are not relevant for the citizen-centric survey) but where there is overlap, the data collected in both surveys should be the same.

Furthermore, future surveys should record all error types for all citizens which could amount to multiple errors per citizen. When calculating covert errors of inclusion however, only one ‘count’ can be given for any one citizen (even if multiple aspects of their registration is wrong). Careful re-coding needs to happen to ensure this is reflected correctly in the error calculation. The only exception is an error where a name has been repeated. This must be dealt with separately and factored into the errors of deletion proportionate to the amounts of times the name is repeated. This should be done as well as calculating any other errors of inclusion from incorrect information in the registration of the same citizen.

Whether any one error with a registration amounts to an inability to vote, is difficult. While a wrong date of birth may not prevent a citizen voting when it is a year out, it may do so when it is thirty years out. Furthermore, different polling booths/officials may respond differently to errors on any given day. This makes it difficult to concretely suggest some errors may always prevent a citizen from voting or not.
Citizens with errors in their registration should be asked if they have ever experienced problems with exercising their right to vote to gauge a sense of error types which may lead to inability to vote.

In the citizen-centric survey, the error of being registered within the wrong PP should ideally not be conceptualized as an error with the registration but an error of (outright) inclusion for that respective PP as the frame of reference for error measurement is the PP. From the list-centric survey you would conversely identify people on the voter list for the PP who should not be (as they do not live in that PP).

In the list-centric surveys, when an address has not been physically found in the field, this has been categorized along with other errors of deletion – essentially under the assumption that as the address has not been found, the registration on the list is not valid. While this may legitimately be the case, the methodology used in this study cannot confirm this to be the case. It may simply be that the infrastructure is poor and the street simply has not been located but is there. It ought to be noted that the Jaagte Rahol team have indicated that it took them approximately six months to familiarize themselves with the infrastructure of Shantinagar where they were working providing a first indication of infrastructure being a mitigating factor here. Further evidence comes from the fact that in Hebbal, the control AC, the proportion of ‘address not founds’ was nearly three times higher (37% of total sample in this AC) as compared with Shantinagar (13% of total sample in this AC). Using Shantinagar figures where the infrastructure is more familiar, it could be tentatively suggested therefore that two thirds of the ‘address not founds’ in Hebbal may be findable. Beyond that, whether a citizen is resident at the address is an additional question. The critical point is that some further methods ought to be explored to better ascertain the proportion of addresses on the voter list that really are not in the PP. That said, of course, the fact the streets cannot be found is a further layer of problem with the voter lists. If surveyors are unable to find a large proportion of addresses, do the ECI encounter similar problems when they verify registrations on the list which is part of the process of registration on the list?
2.3 Quality of list study Delhi (2013)

2.3.1 Introduction
The study aimed to measure the quality of the voter list in Delhi with regard to errors of deletion in particular. To do this, a voter-list centric survey of seven ACs in Delhi was undertaken. This included 34 PPs within each AC.

2.3.2 Method
- Janaagraha’s research team led the project
- TNS Global undertook the field work
- Voter-list centric study
- All interviews were conducted face-to-face using a standard-structured questionnaire.
- The fieldwork was conducted between 5th October and 31st October, 2013.

2.3.3 Sampling
- 7 of Delhi’s 34 Assembly constituencies (ACs) were selected using semi-purposive stratified random sampling, considering a desired mix of centre and periphery ACs as well as general geographic spread.
- Within each of the 7 ACs, 34 Polling Parts (PPs) were selected using randomization of the total universe of polling parts per AC and selecting the first 34 randomized parts.
- From each PP, 25 respondents were randomly selected from the electoral list of that polling part using randomization of the total universe of names on the polling parts with the randomization function engineered to select the first 25 voter serial IDs in the randomized data-set.
- The first ten of these 25 citizens became first attempt respondents, and the 11th-25th voter IDs acted as substitute respondents.
- From this list, Janaagraha asked for substitutes only to be invoked if a name was not at home (after 3 attempts), refused the survey or half completed the survey. If the respondent who corresponded to the voter ID was not at home, a family member above the age of 18 who was aware of the respondent’s voter details (spelling of name, whether they were dead, etc.) was surveyed. If there were no family members or they were not aware of the details, three attempts were made to contact the respondent. If the respondent could not be contacted a substitute respondent was selected.

‘Not Founds’ (as in, instances where the citizen’s information could not be verified because the address given on the voter list was not found) were asked to be included as a valid part of the sample as a respondent completed in full (since being ‘not found’ was an informative outcome) and thus making up the desired sample size of 10 respondents.

However what actually happened was that substitutes were also used for ‘not founds’ by the field team. So, substitutes were also used if the original respondent’s address could not be found after three serious attempts. These ‘not founds’ were included in the final sample and marked as error type ‘not found’. No distinction was made between a ‘not found’ substitution and any other kind of substitution. Nor was any distinction made between an ‘address not found’ and a ‘person not found’.

One benefit of this approach was that if the first ten names were ‘not founds’ or a large majority of them were, the data would not have been usable. Having the capped additional substitutes was useful in biasing the sample towards finding addresses (and therefore, people) in the first place.
2.3.4 Error Categorisations
The survey only reported on potential errors of deletion. Included in these were:

- Citizens who were dead
- Citizens who had shifted from the address
- Citizens whose house could not be found

As discussed in the previous section, there may be scope for voter-list surveys to measure errors of inclusion in terms of those citizens registered on the list with errors. The merits and issues around this will be discussed.

2.3.5 Findings
Table 12 shows the total errors found across all Assembly Constituencies sampled in Delhi as well as a breakdown of the error types. As can be seen, 19% of the sample of citizens from the voter list were either dead, had shifted or their address was not found. These are essentially errors of deletion and, when scaled up, this can be equated to 23 lakh names requiring deletion from voter lists across Delhi.

Table 12. Total errors found across all citizens sampled in Delhi*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Address not found</th>
<th>Shifted</th>
<th>Total (~% of potential deletions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1% (n=41)</td>
<td>8% (n=214)</td>
<td>10% (n=270)</td>
<td>19% (n=525)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer. Total sample n=2847

As in the Shantinagar/Hebbal study, a large proportion of the potential deletions are as a result of the address not being found. The same points of note should be observed with this study (as in Shantinagar/Hebbal) with the conceptualisation of ‘address not found’ as an error of deletion.

Out of those whose names should have been deleted, 178 (57%) were male while 133 (43%) were female.

Out of those who were present, 5% (n=122 out of 2322 who were present) of registrations contained errors. Table 13 below shows the breakdown of error types.

Table 13: Error types with those present at their address* (% out of those present at address)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wrong polling booth</th>
<th>Repeated</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Father’s/husband’s name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Sex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1% (n=6)</td>
<td>1% (n=20)</td>
<td>1% (n=26)</td>
<td>1% (n=25)</td>
<td>1% (n=33)</td>
<td>1% (n=19)</td>
<td>&lt;1% (n=3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer.

**Citizens may have reported multiple errors with their details so n may not sum to 122

Citizens who were present at the address (n=2322) were asked how many times they had had to register before they were successful. Unfortunately, responses were only captured for 122 citizens. Of the latter,
35 citizens said they had never tried, yet were registered. This data is therefore not usable. Furthermore, demographic data such as housing type, religion and caste was captured in an inconsistent manner and is also not usable.

The data from this survey has however, been used to look at proportions of errors of deletion comparative to margins of victory and voter turn-out in the 2008 Delhi State elections. The following paragraphs replicate the relevant sections of this analysis.

Table 14 shows the breakdown of errors by AC, including the corresponding total percentage of names this equates to deleting within each AC.

Table 14: Errors by AC in Delhi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assembly Constituency</th>
<th>Total surveyed (n)</th>
<th>Present (n)</th>
<th>Dead (n)</th>
<th>Not Found (n)</th>
<th>Shifted (n)</th>
<th>% of names to be deleted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burari</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttam Nagar</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazagargh</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jangapura</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deoli</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambedkar Nagar</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahadra</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2847</strong></td>
<td><strong>2322</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
<td><strong>214</strong></td>
<td><strong>270</strong></td>
<td><strong>Average: 19%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data has been used to extrapolate the total number of names to be deleted on the voter list within each AC as outlined in Table 15.

Table 15: Extrapolation of number of names to be deleted from the list for each AC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assembly Constituency</th>
<th>Total number of registered voters (2013)</th>
<th>Percentage of errors</th>
<th>Total number of names to be deleted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burari</td>
<td>232511</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>56451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttam Nagar</td>
<td>181852</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>36849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazagargh</td>
<td>204787</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>49248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jangapura</td>
<td>123753</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deoli</td>
<td>180282</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>34972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambedkar Nagar</td>
<td>119944</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahadra</td>
<td>153110</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>28571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AVERAGE</strong></td>
<td><strong>170891</strong></td>
<td><strong>19%</strong></td>
<td><strong>32639</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, the information has been used to show how the number of names to be deleted from the voter list within each AC is higher than the margin of victory in the Delhi State Elections in 2008 as shown in Table 16.

In each of the seven Assembly Constituencies in which the study was undertaken, the margin of victory in 2008 in six out of seven constituencies was less than the number of names that needed to be deleted from the voter list. In Burari AC, the margin of victory was 4990 votes, when the number of names to be deleted was over 45,000, while in Shahadra AC the margin of victory was 1536 votes, where the number of names to be deleted is over 25,000 names.

**Table 16: Breakdown of margin of victory versus names to be deleted from the voter list for the 2008 Delhi State elections.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assembly Constituency</th>
<th>Registered voters (as per 2008 list)</th>
<th>Voter turnout in 2008 elections</th>
<th>Total % of names to be deleted</th>
<th>Total ‘n’ names to be deleted</th>
<th>Margin of victory in 2008 elections</th>
<th>% margin of victory of 2008 list</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burari</td>
<td>190130</td>
<td>106372</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>46161</td>
<td>4990</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttam Nagar</td>
<td>162590</td>
<td>101606</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>32946</td>
<td>7183</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazagargh</td>
<td>173022</td>
<td>102359</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>41629</td>
<td>11453</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jangapura</td>
<td>109526</td>
<td>65375</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11138</td>
<td>13951</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deoli</td>
<td>169220</td>
<td>95596</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>32808</td>
<td>16628</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambedkar Nagar</td>
<td>122869</td>
<td>70553</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10037</td>
<td>4837</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahadra</td>
<td>152797</td>
<td>87332</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>28512</td>
<td>1536</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data has also been used to re-calculate voter turn-out percentages for the 2008 Delhi State elections. If the neglected deletions found in the Delhi study were taken out of the voter lists, the actual voter-turnout percentage would be substantially higher as shown in Table 17 below.

**Table 17: Re-calculation of voter turn-out for 2008 Delhi State elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assembly Constituency</th>
<th>Registered voters (as per 2008 list)</th>
<th>Voter turnout in 2008 elections</th>
<th>Voter turnout (%)</th>
<th>Total % of names to be deleted</th>
<th>Total ‘n’ names to be deleted</th>
<th>Accurate registered voters (after deletions)</th>
<th>Actual voter turnout percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burari</td>
<td>190130</td>
<td>106372</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>46161</td>
<td>143969</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttam Nagar</td>
<td>162590</td>
<td>101606</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>32946</td>
<td>129644</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazagargh</td>
<td>173022</td>
<td>102359</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>41629</td>
<td>131393</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jangapura</td>
<td>109526</td>
<td>65375</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11138</td>
<td>98388</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deoli</td>
<td>169220</td>
<td>95596</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>32808</td>
<td>136412</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambedkar Nagar</td>
<td>122869</td>
<td>70553</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10037</td>
<td>112832</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahadra</td>
<td>152797</td>
<td>87332</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>28512</td>
<td>124285</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.3.6 Summary
Key findings are as follows:

- Just under a fifth (19%) of names on the voter list in Delhi require deletion.
- In six of the seven ACs covered in the survey, the margin of victory in the 2008 Delhi state elections was less than the number of names that need to be deleted from the voter list.
- Voter turn-out percentages increase significantly for all seven ACs when the respective proportions of names are deleted from the list.

2.3.7 Discussion
The conceptualization of ‘address not found’ as an error of deletion, as in the Shantinagar/Hebbal study, remains a topic for address. Although a concerted effort went into finding households (including three attempted visits to the address, talking to the community members available each time, going to the local EC etc.), conceptualizing ‘address not founds’ as errors may not be conceptually accurate and furthermore, is masking another layer of issue with regards to the structural issues of the voter list. In essence, not finding the address may be as a result of:

- Poor infrastructure - but the address does exist within the PP – which could result in two things once the address is located:
  - The citizen is resident there (registered with or without errors) – NOT A DELETION
  - The citizen is not resident there (shifted/dead etc.) – A DELETION
- The address is really not there – which equates to a legitimate deletion on the voter list – A DELETION

As in the Shantinagar/Hebbal study, in the list-centric survey, it must be made clear what the errors with the address are. Given the surveyor should only be looking for the citizen at the address specified, the only error with the address could be the spelling or omission of some details (i.e. not the door number/street name).

The issue of margins of victory is more complex. Deletions signify additional names on the list which should not be there and can potentially be used as ‘phantom’ voters to influence margins of victory regardless of potential additions to the list (as shown in Table 16). However, if you consider also the percentage of names that have been omitted, margins of victory may well be different (as those who have been omitted from the list could have cast a vote influencing the margins of victory). It would be beneficial to have indicators of both the percentage of deletions and additions to voter lists to paint a more informative picture of possibilities when it comes to margins of victory in elections.

As in the Shantinagar/Hebbal study, errors with the registration of citizens includes being registered in the wrong PP. Given the fundamental premise of a list-centric survey is to find a citizen at the address listed, it is unclear how it can be consistently determined that someone is registered in the wrong PP. Either a person is resident there at the address or they are not (i.e. if not, these should be errors of deletion rather than errors with registrations). If they are not there, the surveyor cannot be required to find where that person might physically be. In some instances someone at the address may know but this is not consistent across those sampled. In the same vain, errors with the citizen’s address in a list-
centric survey can only be errors of spelling or missing components (rather than incorrect door number/street name).
3. Learnings from Quality of List Studies 2012-2014
Following the quality of list studies between 2012 and 2014, there was reflection upon the methodology and conceptualization of measuring the quality of voter lists.

3.1 Overview
In summary, it was determined that the following considerations need to be addressed in the methodology and conceptualization of good quality voter lists:

- For voter-list centric surveys, accurately measure and conceptualise the issue of ‘address not found’; introduce new layer of verification of the address instead of simply accepting these as errors of deletion.
- Record errors with registration details separately for each kind of error - (both survey types)
- Errors with photos can only be established for those people with a voting card as pictures are not printed on the publicly available PDF versions of the voter lists. Questions about accuracy/presence of photo will therefore be done by way of questions in the survey (and only for those with a voter card).
- Allow multiple errors with registrations to be recorded per citizen [record as one count per citizen with regard to ability to vote however – repetitions should not be included here and should be considered separately, see below] – (both survey types)
- Repeated entries on the voter list should be considered as errors of deletion – (both survey types)
- Number of repeated entries should be recorded and the rate of errors of deletion should reflect the number of repetitions – (both survey types)
- Use the same questions and methods to collect errors with registrations for both survey types where appropriate.
- Errors on the list can lead to being unable to vote; explore this concept further – (both survey types)
- The reference point for error measurement should be clearly defined – preferably as the PP. Whether someone is on the list at all in all of India is hard to verify as there’s no central list database to check easily nor at an AC level. The PP level is the smallest reference unit and also the unit at which voting occurs. Therefore, in the citizen-centric surveys, incidents where the citizen is not registered in the PP in question, should be considered as an outright error of inclusion rather than as an only an error with the registration (as those in point 3). In the list-centric survey it should be an error of deletion. In the latter in fact, the reference point more specifically is the exact address and if the person is not found there is an error of deletion. The proportion of citizens who are not at the specific address but still within the correct PP, would be picked up from the citizen-centric survey and cross-calibrated to validly calculate errors relative to the PP.
- Ensure that errors of deletion/inclusion etc. are calculated on the basis of fact rather than self-report basis – (both survey types)
• For people who self-report registration but are not on the list, explore when people last tried to register on the list to mitigate for recent registration requests which have not yet made it onto the list and understand other issues around this.

In terms of application of the data:

• Make net calculations of additions and deletions on basis of new parameters (as above for how to conceptualise additions/deletions etc.) for calculating potential voter turn-out.

In terms of sampling:

• For list-centric surveys, do not have a variable cap on substitutes. This is very hard to implement on the field. Take the maximum number of respondents as per desirable from the capping model and take a response/try to approach all of these.
• For the list-centric surveys, following from above point, pre-select all citizen names from the list and consider these the sample basis.
• For the list-centric surveys, clearly distinguish between ‘address not found’ and ‘person not found’.

The above points lead to the conceptualization and reporting of the quality of the voter list to be sliced in five ways, relative to a polling part (and scaled to city-level). Table 25 highlights this division and where each measurement is taken from and Figures 2 and 3 (in the Error Calculations section below) show the survey flow that reaches the purported error measurement for each part. The refined methodology is described in further detail below.

Table 25: Showing proposed conceptualization and reporting of the quality of the voter list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage error with address on the voter list (unable to verify any further details therefore)</td>
<td>Combination of Phase 1 and Phase 2 from the list-centric surveys (outlined in revised methodology section below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage error of inclusion (physical absence of name in the PP)</td>
<td>Citizen-centric surveys</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Percentage error of deletion (physical presence of a name in the PP that shouldn’t be there) | • Phase 1 and 2 of List-centric surveys.  
• Alignment of repeated names discovered from both citizen and list-centric surveys  
• Alignment with proportion of citizens from the citizen-centric survey who are registered in the PP but with an error on their address (other than address or missing parts, i.e. wrong door number or street name). |
| Percentage error leading to potential inability to vote (errors with the details of the citizen’s registration) | Alignment of errors discovered from both citizen and list-centric surveys                                                                |
| Percentage of no error                                                     | Alignment from citizen centric and list-centric surveys                                                                               |
3.2 Error conceptualization and calculation in survey-flow
The following section outlines how the considerations raised in terms of methodology and conceptualization of good quality voter lists can translate into improved survey flows to ensure accurate data on errors on the voter list. Following this, there is an outline of how errors on the voter list can be calculated using the data gathered from the proposed survey flows.

3.2.1 Citizen-centric survey flow for error calculations
Figure 2 below shows the key survey-flow to define and capture errors with the voter list using the citizen-centric method. Other questions to capture other details have been outlined but not defined by flow.

3.2.2 Voter-list centric survey flow for error calculations
Figure 3 below shows the key survey-flow to define and capture errors with the voter list using the voter-list centric method. Other questions to capture other details have been outlined but not defined by flow.

It is important to note that the survey would be phase 2 for the voter-list centric part of the research. Phase 1 would be a desk review of the addresses for the citizens sampled from the voter lists. Addresses would be scored for inclusion of each part of the address to provide an indication of whether the address is substantial enough to be found in the field. Those citizens whose address quality falls below the threshold would still be sought in the field but if the address is not found then would be considered an error with the quality of the address and map on the voter list. It will not be considered as an error of deletion; if the address was of better quality, the entry may be either correct or a deletion. Until the address is of better quality, there can be no certainty on this. Addresses that pass the quality threshold and are subsequently not found in the field, will be considered errors of deletion (further details are given in section 7.2.1 below).

3.2.3 Error calculations
Table 26 below summarises the error conceptualization in a tabular form. Below this are given the calculations that will form the basis of the error categories.
Figure 2: Survey-flow to define and capture errors with the voter list using the citizen-centric method

Self-reported: Does the citizen think they are registered at the address found?

- Yes
- No
- D/K

Verification: Is the citizen actually registered within the PP?

- Yes
- No

ERROR of (outright) INCLUSION

For all: Explore if have tried to register/how many times & when was last attempt. Interest to register and barriers to (trying to) registering. Are they registered at any other address they know of? In same AC, state etc.

For those who thought they were registered: Explore against duration lived at household. Explore if believed to be registered elsewhere (where & why). Explore if they have EPIC card. Explore if they have tried to vote in their PP (of particular interest for those who are registered but in wrong PP, right AC).

Are there any errors with the registration details?

- Yes
- No

NO ERROR

With which aspect is the error? Select as many as apply.

- Husband/father’s name
- Address
- Name
- Age
- sex
- Photo (can only be verified if they have a voter ID)

ERROR of possible inability to vote – one error calculated per person regardless of number of errors [note: overlap with similar V-L errors; Compare the proportions of errors across the surveys]

ERROR of (MULTIPLE) DELETION to the magnitude of the number of entries minus 1 [note: overlap with similar V-L errors; Compare the proportions of errors across the surveys]

For all: Explore if have tried to register/how many times & when was last attempt. Explore if have tried to correct any of the errors above & if so, how many times.
Figure 3: Survey-flow to define and capture errors with the voter list using the voter-list centric method

Phase 1: Do the address details fulfill the quality criteria?
- Yes
  - Phase 2: Is the address found in the field?
    - Yes
      - Person sampled at the address?
        - Yes
          - Error of DELETION
        - No
          - Error with the quality of the address/map on the voter list
    - No
      - Error of DELETION

- No
  - Are there any errors with the registration details?
    - No
      - NO ERROR
    - Yes
      - With which aspect is the error? Select as many as apply.
        - Person was not found
        - Dead
        - Shifted
        - Person disenfranchised

ERROR of possible inability to vote – one error calculated per person regardless of number of errors [note: overlap with similar C-C errors; Compare the proportions of errors across the surveys]

Capture specific errors within each category too – i.e. address number, etc. Explore how many times they had to register before successful.

Explore any problems with voting as a result of any of the error types above. Explore if they have tried to correct any of the errors above & if so, how...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1 – DESK BASED</th>
<th>Phase 2 – FIELD WORK</th>
<th>VOTER QUALITY CATEGORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST - CENTRIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address Quality PASS</td>
<td>Address found</td>
<td>Voter found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Voter not found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Address not found</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address Quality FAIL</td>
<td>Address found</td>
<td>Voter found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Voter not found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Address not found</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITIZEN CENTRIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Door available</strong></td>
<td>Registered on the list in the PP - <strong>YES</strong></td>
<td>No error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Errors</strong></td>
<td>ALL errors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUB-SET:</strong> Wrong address, same PP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Repeated</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Registered on the list in the PP - NO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Door locked</strong></td>
<td>Door closed/Non-participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. <strong>NO ERROR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. <strong>POTENTIAL INABILITY TO VOTE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. <strong>PROPORTION TO BE REMOVED FROM DELETIONS in LINE 5 in LIST-CENTRIC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. <strong>DELETION (proportional)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. <strong>OMISSION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. <strong>REMOVE FROM SAMPLE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DELETIONS = \[
\frac{(3*+5+6+9**+11+12**)}{15}
\]
\[
\frac{\text{TOTAL LIST CENTRIC -10-4}}{\text{TOTAL CITIZEN CENTRIC -18}}
\]

*Cross-check proportions of 3s and 9s with 16s. Should be equivalent and can be aligned
**Can include here and/or in DELETION – CORE QUALITY portion

DELETION (CORE QUALITY) = \[
\frac{12}{\frac{\text{TOTAL LIST CENTRIC -10-4}}{\text{TOTAL CITIZEN CENTRIC -18}}}
\]

OMISSIONS = \[
\frac{17}{\frac{\text{TOTAL CITIZEN CENTRIC -18}}{\text{TOTAL LIST CENTRIC -10-4}}}
\]

POTENTIAL INABILITY TO VOTE = \[
\frac{2+8}{\frac{\text{TOTAL LIST CENTRIC -10-4}}{\text{TOTAL CITIZEN CENTRIC -18}}}
\]

NO ERROR = \[
\frac{1+7}{\frac{\text{TOTAL LIST CENTRIC -10-4}}{\text{TOTAL CITIZEN CENTRIC -18}}}
\]
4. Quality of List Research 2014-15

The methodology outlined in Section 5 for error conceptualization and calculation was applied in Janaagraha’s Quality of Voter List studies from 2014-15. All research work done since 2014 has been documented in a series of stand-alone reports. A description of the work is given in each section long with a link to the respective report online on Janaagraha’s publications page.

4.1 Quality of the voter list in Delhi, 2014-15

This study, a part of the efforts by Janaagraha to improve the accuracy of voter lists in India’s urban centres, was conducted in Delhi just before the 2015 assembly elections. This study aimed to serve as a body of objective information that throws light on the issues inherent in Delhi’s voter lists*. It was designed to effectively capture deletions, i.e. people who exist on a voter list but shouldn’t be, as well as omissions i.e. people who should be on the voter list but are not. Using a two-pronged approach, the study used a Voter List-Centric methodology (to capture deletions) and a Citizen-Centric methodology (for omissions) and went to over 6,000 citizens spread across Delhi in a manner that ensured robust representation. Key findings from the study are as follows:

- The list-centric research, which was based on a sample of citizens who existed on Delhi’s lists, found that 41% of these entries included one of a range of errors. Eleven percent of all addresses on the list could not be located on ground despite a desk-based address quality research stage indicating that all but two of these addresses were ‘findable’. It was also found that 21% of sampled citizens who were on the list had shifted to another location. A further 7% of citizens had errors in their details mentioned on the list.

- The citizen-centric research, which checked random citizens of Delhi against the voter list, found that 49% were omitted from their polling part voter lists. Twenty eight percent were registered elsewhere in Delhi and 8% claimed to have applied from their current address but were not on the list. Twelve percent had either not/never applied to register on their polling part (PP) list or could not recall if they ever had.

- Data from the two surveys indicates that potential deletions and omissions in Delhi’s electoral rolls are of a large magnitude. A more nuanced picture emerges when reading the two research phases together. A large part of required deletions in Delhi may be ‘off-set’ by omissions due to intra-city migration i.e. it appears that most citizens who should be ‘deleted’ from the voter list (23% were not found at the address mentioned against them on the voter list), are actually residing somewhere else within Delhi (in another Polling Part or in another Assembly Constituency). This conclusion is made in relation to the fact that 28% of omitted citizens from the voter list are registered elsewhere in the city.

Reports available:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4.2 Quality of the voter list in Patna, 2015

In June 2015, surveys measuring the quality of the voter list were extended to the city of Patna with particular focus on coverage of areas classified as ‘high migration’. Janaagraha, during an earlier
scoping study in Patna, was left with a large percentage (70%) of sampled citizen addresses on the voter list as ‘not found’; to mitigate this, the methodology had devised a stage of research which assessed ‘address quality’ i.e. assessing whether addresses given on the voter list contained information considered adequate in finding an address on ground.

Preparatory field investigations to develop assessment parameters in Patna led to a change in approach. Address infrastructure in the city and on its voter list were found wanting and instead of launching the full-fledged study, Janaagraha rolled out a Pilot in July 2015 to estimate the proportion of addresses that would be deemed ‘not found’. Conducted in four out of the eight ACs administered by the Patna Municipal Corporation (PMC), with a sample size of 600, the results of the pilot led to the ceasing of all further stages to measure the quality of the voter list as 45% of addresses sampled from the voter list could not be located on the field.

Reports available:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reports available</th>
<th>URL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
5. The Role of the Booth Level Officer in voter list management

To understand better, the reasons behind the poor state of address information (and overall information in general) on voter rolls, the Patna pilot was followed up with interviews with Booth Level Officers (BLOs). This was the start of a series of research projects looking at the role of the Booth Level Officer in voter list management.

5.1 The Role of the BLO- Patna, 2015

As noted, to understand better, the reasons behind the poor state of address information (and overall information in general) on voter rolls, the Patna pilot was followed up with interviews with Booth Level Officers (BLOs). A total of 14 telephonic interviews, in the ACs where the Patna pilot was conducted, were held in September and October 2015.

Key findings from the study are as follows:

- Procedures followed by BLOs, with respect to voter list updation, both across and within ACs are not uniform. Findings suggest that general work procedures followed differ both across and within ACs, These differences were observed in a host of functions such as facilitating voter list updation, making the Nazariya Naksha and maintaining BLO registers.

- The ‘Nazariya Naksha’, a hand drawn map of a polling part, has to be created and updated by the BLO in the manner clearly laid out in the ECI’s training manuals. However, the way this is being done is not consistent with laid down procedures and also differs both across and within ACs. Some BLOs stated that these numbers had already been allotted and they had not altered it and the ones who claimed to have updated their PPs mentioned differing ways to do so. This issue is compounded by the fact that, as several BLOs stated, PPs have no house or lane numbers, revealing just as the Patna Pilot did, that on ground address infrastructure in the city is weak.

- While receiving forms from citizens, BLOs know which documents to accept as proof but do not seem to give due attention to completion of forms or the quality of data within. The general lack of uniformity seen in work procedures followed does not seem to extend to their knowledge on documentation requirements. However, when asked about the checks they conduct to ensure completeness of forms, not much was said with indications that what information citizens gave is considered more or less complete and accurate. BLOs also stated that the quality of information on forms that they received from the citizen concerned or their family member is more or less the same. However, since not much was spoken about the specific checks they make, how BLOs assess this ‘quality’ remains uncertain.

**Reports available:**

5.2 The Role of the BLO - Bangalore, 2016

5.2.1 Background
In a similar vain to Patna, research in Bangalore initially oriented around analyzing the quality of the voter list. As previously, the aim was to analyse the quality of the voter lists in Bangalore by doing two surveys and collate the data. For the list-centric survey, the plan was to use the list to locate 12 people per polling part in 28 polling parts in each of 10 ACs across Bangalore (i.e. a total representative sample of 3360 citizen entries on the list).

Given earlier difficulties in locating citizen addresses from the voter list on-ground in other cities, the research design for this initial study required the field supervisor to make a list of at least eight people/bodies in a particular locality who would most likely know where an address was. This would include the Booth Level Officer (BLO), the post man, local gas agency, milk man, plumber etc. To find any one address, the interviewer had to speak with at least 3 people on the list and look for the address for at least 30 minutes. In addition to this, all addresses deemed ‘Not Found’ by interviewers on the ground had to be checked by the supervisor (who had to speak with the three people that the interviewer contacted and an additional two people from the resource list whom the interviewer had not contacted). The supervisor was also required to spend at least 30 minutes trying to locate a household marked ‘not found’ by the interviewer.

When our commissioned field work agency began in December 2015, despite these additional aides to locating addresses, they struggled to find addresses listed on the voter list. In the first weeks of field work, in trying to locate 171 citizens’ addresses from the voter list across four ACs in Bangalore, 68 could not be located (40%). When an address cannot be located, it is impossible to verify if the citizen listed on the list exists (at that address) or not. In essence, the inability to locate addresses on the ground makes it impossible to verify the quality of the voter list. To that end, our field work to analyse the quality of voter lists ceased and our focus shifted to researching Booth Level Officers once again.

5.2.2 The study and findings
The overall objective of this study was to try and understand better, the BLO layer in Bangalore and identify areas in their functioning that can be strengthened in order to help address challenges to urban voter list management. The research was done in three phases, including desktop research on BLO details published online for 11 Assembly Constituencies sampled, qualitative in-depth interviews with 10 BLOs and Computer Aided Telephonic Interviews (CATIs) with 106 BLOs sampled through stratified random sampling from ten Assembly Constituencies in Bangalore. Key findings from the study are as follows:

- The desktop research phase found 92% of BLOs were found to be in charge of only 1 PP as stated in the ECI’s guidelines but 8% were in charge of two or more PPs. Findings from the telephonic interviews however, showed that 44% of BLOs are in charge of more than 1 PP, significantly higher than the 8% suggested by a reading of the data available online. This goes against the ECI’s guideline of having one BLO for one PP which recognises that a single BLO may find it difficult to work efficiently if in charge of such a large volume of voters
- A majority of the BLOs from the 11 ACs that were a subject of this study were Teachers (37%). The second biggest occupation class was that of Clerks (21%) followed by Tax Inspectors (10%), Revenue Inspectors (6%) and Anganwadi Teachers (5%). Some Students,
Private School Teachers and even Janaagraha employees were found on the list of BLOs in Bangalore obtained from the website of the CEO, Karnataka; this is in violation of the ECI guidelines mandating that only govt., semi govt., and retired govt. personnel be hired as BLOs.

• To help BLOs perform their duties efficiently and accurately, ECI guidelines state that they be provided with a ‘BLO Kit’ and be trained adequately. However, a large proportion of BLOs reported that they had never received some of these materials that can help them do their job. 18% reported that they had never received a BLO ID card, 25% an appointment letter, 48% a BLO register and 48%, the BLO handbook. An absence of any of these documents/materials has the potential to become a major impediment to BLOs carrying out their duties.

• During the qualitative phase, while most BLOs reported being satisfied with the trainings that they received, a few issues with quality were raised. Data from the CATI showed that most BLOs were indeed satisfied (95%) and most felt that quality was also good. However, it also showed that the frequency of trainings was quite low. A little under 47% of all BLOs reported that they received trainings less than once a year and more than 51% reported that the last time they had received any training was more than a year ago.

• Most BLOs, despite claiming to find trainings satisfactory and useful, were found to be not performing critical functions (e.g. collecting data on citizens who are about to turn 18, on new residential buildings/units that come up in their PP etc.), some of which are also used to inform strategic action by higher layers in the ECI.

• 7% of all BLOs interviewed in the CATI phase (106) said that they conducted no door to door household visits. This number was 10% for the BLOs who were from Inner ACs and only 2% for those in Outer ACs. A majority of all BLOs did report conducting such visits anywhere between 1 and 5 such exercises in a year and, 45% appeared to be spending between 45 and 150 days a year doing so, an enormous amount of time and effort considering they would have been performing the duties required by their full time jobs on these days as well.

• 32% of the BLOs interviewed in the telephonic interview phase said they were not registered as a voter in the PP they were in charge of. Moreover, more than 10% of BLOs interviewed reported that it takes them an hour or more to get to their allotted PP out of which 7% said it takes more than an hour and a half, something that can affect their ability to service their PPs significantly.

• A sizable proportion of all 106 BLOs interviewed in the CATI phase, 11%, said that they had never received any honorarium for the services they rendered as a BLO. This proportion was much higher in Outer ACs, at 19%. Only 55% reported receiving it every year as ordered by ECI. Additionally, among the ones who claimed having received honorariums, 26% said that they had received less than INR 3000 with 25% of this receiving less than INR 2000, an amount substantially less than the ECI mandated amount (INR 5000 for the first PP a BLO is in charge of).

Reports available:

5.3 The role of the BLO – Chennai, 2016

To understand whether issues with the BLO layer of functioning are prevalent in other cities too, research was done in Chennai and Thiruvananthapuram City in 2016. In both cities this focused on looking at the availability and quality of BLO information available online, followed by an examination of access to BLOs and the quality of their assistance, leading to consideration for systemic solutions to issues.

In Chennai, an analysis was done of BLO information available online through the Tamil Nadu CEO website and the ECI’s website. Furthermore, a random sample of 357 telephonic interviews were attempted (approximately 30 in each of the 12 ACs where information was available), resulting in interviews with 26 BLOs. The calls were done to establish actuality of the BLOs and their details listed online as well as to discuss proximity of their home and office to the PP they have been allotted. Furthermore, the frequency of interaction BLOs have with citizens was also discussed. An analysis was also done on 112 polling part voter lists on PP size and quality of the Nazariya Naksha (hand-drawn map).

Key findings from the study are as follows:

- No BLO information is available for more than half of Chennai’s PPs online. Four out of Chennai’s 16 ACs have no BLO information for any of its PPs.
- These 1693 PPs are serviced by a total of 1494 BLOs. 148 BLOs out of these service more than 1 PP.
- Out of a random sample of 357 listed BLOs, only 19 BLOs actually in charge of their listed PPs were contactable by phone after 4 attempts.
- To ensure that BLOs can service their area effectively the ECI mandates that only those residing in a PP can be the BLO for that PP. However, the majority of BLOs (n=12 out of 25) who answered this question in the survey do not live in the PP for which they are a BLO. These BLOs noted they have to travel anywhere up to an hour to reach the PP for which they are a BLO, making it harder to execute their duties.
- The Nazariya Naksha (NN) is a map, which as per ECI guidelines is supposed to be made and updated by BLOs to help them perform their duties better. It gives them an idea of their PP’s boundaries, layout and of the households within. Geographical boundaries and layout of the PPs are unclear and not systematically recorded on the voter list. Ninety five out of the 112 Nazarya Nakshas sampled showed a map of the polling booth rather than the PP. The rest had identical NNs which did not belong to any of the PPs. In short, there was no NN in any of the sampled PPs.
- An analysis of the size of a sample of 112 PPs shows that only 1 BLO has responsibility for more than the guideline 1400 citizens in urban centres. The majority of BLOs sampled service an area with the appropriate number of citizens though 10% of BLOs service more than one PP.
- BLOs are on duty throughout the year, ensuring the citizens in their area are serviced and the voter list remains clean. However, the bulk of the work is centred around elections. Most

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16 The other 7 interviewed were not the BLO for the PP sampled.
BLOs say they do not receive any calls from citizens asking for their help, perhaps reflecting poor availability of BLO information not just online, but elsewhere too. However, while no BLO said they received 30 or more calls on average in a year, four said they did just before elections. This large concentration of work over and above full time employment, makes it harder for BLOs to exercise their duties.

**Report available:**

5.4 The role of the BLO - Thiruvananthapuram City, 2016

As noted above, to understand whether issues with the BLO layer of functioning are prevalent in other cities too, research was done in Chennai and Thiruvananthapuram City in 2016. In both cities this focused on looking at the availability and quality of BLO information available online, followed by an examination of access to BLOs and the quality of their assistance, leading to consideration for systemic solutions to issues.

In Thiruvananthapuram City, an analysis was done of BLO information available online through the Kerala CEO’s website. Furthermore, 100 BLO contacts were randomly sampled from the information available (25 in each of the four ACs) resulting in interviews with 51 BLOs\(^{17}\). The calls were done to establish actuality of BLOs and their details listed online such as designation and office address as well as to discuss proximity of their home and office to the PP they have been allotted. Furthermore, the frequency of interaction BLOs have with citizens was also discussed. An analysis was also done on a sample of 20 PP lists (five drawn randomly from within each AC) to analyse the quality of the Nazariya Naksha against a pre-determined set of parameters.

Key findings from the study are as follows:

- All 578 polling parts have an allocated BLO but 3 of these do not have listed contact phone numbers online. Only two-thirds of a random sample of 84 BLOs were contactable by phone after 4 attempts.
- To ensure that BLOs can service their area effectively, the ECI mandates that only those residing in a PP can be the BLO for that PP. However, the majority of BLOs (n=29 out of 51) surveyed do not live in the PP for which they are a BLO. These BLOs noted they have to travel anywhere up to 90 minutes to reach the PP for which they are a BLO, making it harder to execute their duties.
- The Nazariya Naksha (NN) is a map, which as per ECI guidelines is supposed to be made and updated by BLOs to help them perform their duties better. It gives them an idea of their PP’s boundaries, layout and of the households within. Geographical boundaries and layout of the PPs are unclear and not systematically recorded on the voter list. None of the Nazarya Nakshas sampled showed the PP mapped in any detail. All simply showed the outline of the Assembly Constituency (AC) with an outline of the PP in question which in just over a third of maps sampled was the wrong PP.
- An analysis of the size of all PPs shows that 212 BLOs out of 578 have responsibility for more than the guideline 1400 citizens in urban centres.
- BLOs are on duty throughout the year, ensuring the citizens in their area are serviced and the voter list remains clean. However, the bulk of the work is centred around elections when calls to BLOs from citizens average 67 a month. More than a quarter of BLOs say this can be up to 100 per month and 5 BLOs say it is even more.
- To ensure the voter list remains clean, BLOs are required to conduct statistical analyses such as comparing their PP’s gender ratio to their district’s census data. However, more than half of BLOs are anganwadi workers and may not possess the skills to conduct such analyses.

\(^{17}\) Only 84 had to be called to achieve the quota of interviews desired.
5.5 Booth Level Officer & Landscaping study in 21 cities in India
To assess the scale of voter list management (VLM) issues across urban centres in India, Janaagraha set out to conduct a nationwide study on Booth Level Officers (BLOs) and paint a landscape of VLM process. This study is an amalgamation of the research outlined above by Janaagraha on the role of BLOs in Bengaluru, Chennai and Thiruvananthapuram and additional research in these centres and 18 other urban centres in India.

This study is a combination of the four studies conducted over 2016 and 2017 with the latest one, involving a review of CEO Websites, Polling Part voter lists as well as interviews with over 900 BLOs spread across 18 cities in India selected using stratified random sampling. Interviews were conducted between the months of December 2016 and March 2017. In all, 1,107 BLOs were interviewed across the four studies, resulting in a representative sample with a 95% confidence level and a 1.27% confidence interval.

The key findings from an amalgamation of these studies are presented as answers to seven main questions as given below:

1. **How useful are websites of the CEOs for citizens?**
The websites of the CEOs are intended to provide citizens with all services and information regarding electoral participation, including electoral rolls. The sites allow citizens to use basic services such as a voter search, a polling booth location search and accessing information on basic minimum facilities available at the booth. Very few cities (9 out of 21) allow people to search for their names using SMS but it is not known if this service is available in the local language; none have application tracking using SMS.

2. **How easy is it for citizens to contact BLOs?**
For a total of 9,833 BLO contact numbers tried across the 21 cities, only 2,305 could be reached meaning that in less than a quarter of cases (23%) was a BLO actually spoken to. Nearly a third of all numbers made available by the ECI were either erroneous or did not belong to a BLO. Getting hold of BLOs proved hardest in Mumbai where only 38 BLOs were spoken to after trying to contact 599. In Thiruvananthapuram, the largest proportion of BLOs were contactable (74% of those called were spoken to).

3. **Who are our BLOs?**
Most of the BLOs servicing our cities are teachers (both school and anganwadi), at 59% of all BLOs interviewed. This number increases significantly for cities with populations in the range of up to 2 million. This suggests that teachers remain the go-to resources to be appointed as BLOs despite the ECI’s guidelines recommending against this practice as it affects their ability to teach as required.

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18 Ahmedabad, Bhopal, Bhubaneswar, Chandigarh, Dehradun, Delhi, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Kanpur, Kolkata, Lucknow, Ludhiana, Mumbai, Patna, Pune, Raipur, Ranchi, Surat.
As far as experience goes, urban BLOs are not found wanting with 52% having been one for over 5 years. 78% have been one for at least three years. However, despite having performed the roles and responsibilities of a BLO for so long, we noticed that several do not perform all crucial tasks required of them, which may have to do with their training and the material support they get from the ECI. The most experienced BLOs are in Ahmedabad (88% have been one for five or more years) while this figure is lowest in Delhi (22%).

4. **What support and training do BLOs receive from the ECI?**
The ECI indicate that to keep BLOs efficient, motivated and productive they ensure that they are trained at least once a year, provide them with materials some of which are necessary for them to perform their duties as well as pay them an annual honorarium of INR 6,000 in lieu of the work they do. This study found that close to 12% of all BLOs in cities with a population of above 2 million had not been trained even once in the last year.

Perhaps the most remarkable find was that only 68% of all BLOs had been paid anything in the last year. Furthermore, these BLOs were paid an average of just INR 3,834, far less than the mandated INR 6,000. Moreover, 9% of all BLOs claimed that they had never been paid for their services. Hyderabad had the largest proportion of BLOs (55%) who had not received their honorarium in the last year and BLOs there also had the lowest average honorarium of INR. 2,276. The highest average honorarium was received by BLOs in Dehradun (INR 5,633).

5. **How do BLOs go about doing their job?**
An overwhelming majority of BLOs (82.6%) perform their duties outside of their regular work-hours. In Surat, Ranchi and Delhi nearly all BLOs (98%) said they do their duties outside of regular hours. A little over 72% conduct between 1 and 5 door to door visit exercises in a year and an average BLO does so over 68 days in a year. Between the three city population classifications i.e. Mega, Large and Medium, these aspects do not vary significantly.

6. **What are the difficulties that BLOs face in executing their duties?**
According to the ECI, there should be one BLO for one polling station who should be, to the extent possible, a local resident. An analysis of BLO information available online suggested that 5.7% of all BLOs were in charge of more than 1 PP. Additionally, in the interviews, 9.3% of all BLOs claimed to be in charge of more than 1 PP6. Fifty one percent of BLOs interviewed reported that they are not registered as a voter in the PP they are in charge of, suggesting that they may not be local residents i.e. residing within their PP. Despite this, a majority of BLOs, 78.0%, reported that they reach their allotted PP within 30 minutes.

7. **How satisfied do our BLOs feel about their role?**
A majority of the BLOs, 77.4% said that they were either satisfied or extremely satisfied about their role as one. However, 13.7% of BLOs stating either that they were dissatisfied or extremely dissatisfied is a worrisome finding. The largest proportions of BLOs who were satisfied or extremely satisfied were in Delhi and Chandigarh (91%) while this was lowest in Raipur (27%). Interestingly, satisfaction was not found to be linked to whether or not a BLO had been paid or not in the last one year, nor was it found to be related to travel time to a BLO’s PP. Satisfaction was however, linked with training of BLOs. BLOs that had been trained in the last one year were more likely to feel satisfied with their role as a BLO than those who had not been trained. Teachers were the occupation
group of BLOs more likely to feel dissatisfied with the role of BLO compared with those in other occupations.

*Report available:*

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